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I. INTRODUCTION
Efforts to advance justice and improve the rule of law can be divided
into two categories. One set of efforts-by far the better funded and more
established of the two-focuses on state institutions, on improving the
effectiveness and fairness of the courts, the legislature, the police, the health
and education systems, etc. A second set of efforts, sometimes termed legal
empowerment, focuses on directly assisting ordinary people, especially the
poor, who face justice problems.' There are two primary reasons for
complementing state-centered reforms with this second type of undertaking.
First and most simply, institutional reform is slow and difficult, and there is a
need to tend to those wounded by broken systems not yet fixed. Second-and
this reason conceives of the poor as agents rather than as victims-lasting
institutional change depends on a more empowered polity.
One conventional method of providing legal empowerment is legal
services, including criminal defense, civil legal aid, and public interest
litigation. Another method, which has received increased support in the last
2twenty years, is legal and human rights education. Education is a critical first
step in giving people power. But education alone is often inadequate to
change a person's or a community's capacity to overcome injustice. Legal
services, at their best, can achieve concrete victories for the powerless against
the powerful: an arbitrarily detained juvenile is released, a group of workers
receives its wrongfully unpaid wages, an unjust law is overturned. But legal
services have serious limitations. Lawyers are costly and in short supply.
Courts are often slow, ineffective, and corrupt. Perhaps most significantly, the
solutions afforded by litigation and formal legal process are not always the
kinds of solutions desired by the people involved, and they do not always
contribute meaningfully to the agency of the people they serve.
This Essay argues that the institution of the paralegal offers a promising
methodology of legal empowerment that fits between legal education and
legal representation, one that maintains a focus on achieving concrete
solutions to people's justice problems but which employs, in addition to
litigation, the more flexible, creative tools of social movements.
1. STEPHEN GOLUB, BEYOND RULE OF LAW ORTHODOxY: THE LEGAL EMPOWERMENT
ALTERNATIVE 25 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace Paper No. 41, 2003), available at
http://www.camegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1367&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl.
2. See, e.g., Philip C. Aka, Education, Human Rights, and the Post-Cold War Era, 15 N.Y.L.
ScH. J. Humi. RTS. 421 (1999); Martha Minow, Education for Co-Existence, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 15
(2002).
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Paralegal programs of different stripes exist in Africa, South and East
Asia, Latin America, Europe, and North America. Considered against the
mass and diversity of these existing efforts, paralegals have received scant
attention from legal scholars and major institutions involved in human rights
and development. The legal literature has not established a clear definition of
the paralegal approach to justice services; I will draw on international
experience to suggest a definition later in this Essay. In bare terms, paralegals
who provide justice services are laypeople with basic training in law and
formal government who assist poor and otherwise disempowered communities
to remedy breaches of fundamental rights and freedoms.
The largest part of this Essay reflects in detail on the experience of an
experimental community-based paralegal program in Sierra Leone called
Timap for Justice, which I co-founded and co-direct. 3 One of the premises of
the Essay and of the work it narrates is that the successful provision of justice
services requires serious engagement with the social and legal particularities
of a given context. Indeed, an earlier generation of efforts to provide justice
services in the "third world" failed because of an unwillingness to heed socio-
legal specificity.4 For that reason, I believe that a close examination of the
evolution and operation of a single program in one place is a useful way to
begin to demonstrate the potential of the paralegal as an institution.
Parts H.A and II.B portray the justice context in Sierra Leone, first with
a few stories of individual justice problems and then with a consideration of
four features of Sierra Leone's socio-legal landscape: the rule of "big
persons," the dualist legal structure, the persistence of violence, and the failed
social infrastructure. Parts II.C through .E examine the paralegal program
through which my colleagues and I have begun to intervene in this distinctive
context. I draw out, often through treatment of specific cases, five aspects of
our work: 1) the creative and diverse set of methods our paralegals employ, in
part to make up for absent and dysfunctional state institutions; 2) the strategic
use of our paralegals' association with the law, including legal knowledge and
a connection to the capacity to litigate; 3) our alternative, community-and
justice-centered conception of professional duty; 4) our attempt to move
3. Timap for Justice began as a joint initiative of the Sierra Leonean National Forum for
Human Rights and the Open Society Justice Initiative. The National Forum for Human Rights is a
coalition of forty-one Sierra Leonean human rights organizations. The Open Society Justice Initiative,
an operational program of the Open Society Institute, pursues law reform activities grounded in the
protection of human rights, and contributes to the development of legal capacity for open societies
worldwide. The Justice Initiative combines litigation, legal advocacy, technical assistance, and the
dissemination of knowledge to secure advances in the following priority areas: national criminal justice,
international justice, freedom of information and expression, and equality and citizenship. A
crosscutting program dedicated to fostering legal capacity underpins these efforts. Timap for Justice
became an independent Sierra Leonean organization in 2005; Timap continues to receive technical and
financial support from the Justice Initiative.
4. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062.
Trubek and Galanter's famous article is said to have marked the death of the law and development
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Trubek and Galanter argued that U.S.-sponsored efforts to
support, among other things, legal education and legal aid in the third world were misguided and likely
to fail because of their reliance on an idealized, American-centered, "liberal legalist" model of law and
society.
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beyond the conventional notion of service toward addressing community-level
problems and cultivating agency among the people with whom we work; and
5) our synthetic orientation toward Sierra Leone's dualist legal structure. Part
II.F distills from this discussion the model by which our paralegals achieve
improbable just results. Part ll.G addresses the question of sustainability.
I believe that the story of our work in Sierra Leone will be valuable for
other efforts to develop primary justice services, and especially so in countries
with one or both of the following characteristics: devastated, "failed" state
structures, as in Liberia, Sudan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Iraq, and Afghanistan; and dualist or pluralist legal systems, as in much of
Africa and South Asia.
Part I steps back from Sierra Leone to assess the range and character of
paralegal programs existing in the world. Part III.A considers the various
functions paralegals perform. Parts III.B and II.C identify the essence of the
paralegal approach which unites these efforts, and elaborate the ways in which
this approach complements conventional legal aid. Part II.D addresses three
structural issues: the nature of paralegal training, the remuneration of
paralegals, and the relationship between paralegal programs and governments.
I advocate in part II.E for invigorated support for paralegal efforts from the
human rights and development communities, both at the level of resources and
at the level of ideas.
I. COMMUNITY-BASED PARALEGALS IN SIERRA LEONE
A. Prelude: Three Justice Problems
1. Paramount Chiefs Interference in Customary Legal System
Pa "Musa Lansana"5 is a Temne-speaking farmer from Maqui Village,
Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, in Northern Sierra Leone. At sixty-five, he walks
with the deliberateness and dignity of someone who has lived longer than
most men in his community ever will. 6 He is the patriarch of the Lansana
family in Maqui.
Under customary land tenure, freehold ownership of land is not possible:
land belongs to the community, including those who came before and those
who have yet to come. Chiefs are the temporal custodians for this cross-
temporal set of owners. But families do have a softer right to the land they
occupy, one based on a historic allocation by a chief and a tradition of
possession and cultivation thereafter.7 The Lansanas have such an entitlement
to a large and fertile plot of land in Maqui. For several generations the
Lansanas have allowed other village farmers to plant and harvest palm trees
on sections of their land at no cost. In 2004, because of a series of family
5. Names have been changed throughout this Essay to protect client confidentiality.
6. As of 2002, the life expectancy at birth for Sierra Leonean men was about thirty-two.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH REPORT 117 (2004), available at
http:llwww.who.intlwhr/2004/enlreportO4_en.pdf.
7. See M. Fofanah, Customary Law in the Justice System in Sierra Leone, in HANDBOOK FOR
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, CLERKS AND BAILIFFS 76, 76-77 (2003).
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tragedies, the Lansanas' financial situation became dire, and the extended
family faced considerable difficulty in feeding and schooling all its children.
Pa Lansana and his brothers decided to ask for a contribution of five
gallons of palm oil from each of the families who harvested on Lansana
family land. According to Pa Lansana, all but two families welcomed the
chance to show their appreciation for land from which they had benefited for
many years. Two families, however, headed by "Pa Jamil" and "Pa Kanu"
respectively, refused. This began an expensive misadventure in the customary
justice system.
As is the case in many African countries, law in Sierra Leone is
bifurcated: a formal legal system based on that of the former colonial master
(in this case, Great Britain) coexists with a customary system that is, in
principle, based on traditional approaches to justice. The formal system in
Sierra Leone is heavily concentrated in the capital while the customary system
prevails in the countryside. Pa Lansana resorted to the de facto first tier of the
customary justice system: the village chief's court. The vast majority of
village and section chiefs adjudicate claims within their localities, issuing
summonses, conducting hearings, making judgments, and collecting fines.
These courts have existed for generations, though they are outlawed by the
statute that lays out the architecture of Sierra Leone's modem dualist legal
structure.
8
Every step in a chief's adjudication costs money. Pa Lansana paid 2000
Leones (U.S.D. $0.75) 9 to the village chief to issue a summons for Jamil and
Kanu to report to the chief. When they refused, he paid the same chief another
5000 Leones (U.S.D. $1.89) to inform "all those who are harvesting palm oil
on my land without my consent" that he, Pa Lansana, would be hiring a
sorcerer for the purpose of cursing the offenders.
The sorcerer, however, did not produce the short-term result Lansana
was hoping for. At this point, Lansana decided to file his case in the "local
court" in Magburaka. The local courts are the official judicial institutions of
the customary legal system. "Chiefdoms" are the primary administrative units
in the countryside; each chiefdom has between one and four local courts. Soon
after filing in local court, Pa Lansana received a letter from Pa Roke, the
acting paramount chief of Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom. 10 It turns out that Pa
Jamil and Pa Kanu were both related to Paramount Chief Pa Roke. The letter
informed Lansana that Pa Roke was removing his case from local court and
that he, Pa Roke, would personally settle the matter. Pa Lansana protested this
removal to the local court chairman, but the chairman instructed Lansana to
respect the paramount chief's wishes.
Pa Lansana, out of options and in over his head, reported to the
paramount chief's quarters. He did not have a chance. During a series of
hearings over the course of two weeks, the chief levied fine after fine against
Lansana-for speaking out of turn, for stating that his right to his land was
8. See generally Local Courts Act, 1963 (Sierra Leone).
9. Dollar estimates are based on a conversion rate of 2650 Leones (S.L.L.) to 1 U.S. Dollar
(U.S.D.).
10. A paramount chief is the executive ruler of a chiefdom.
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immune to interference by chiefs, for challenging the paramount chief s right
to hear the case. Lansana was also charged 20,000 Leones (U.S.D. $7.55) to
pay transport costs for all the section chiefs to congregate in Magburaka (the
chiefdom headquarters) to discuss his case. In all, Lansana paid 67,000
Leones (U.S.D. $25.28) to the paramount chief in fines and transport costs and
also apologized for the statements that were deemed offensive. These fines
were all procedural, levied before the paramount chief came to any decision
on the substantive question of whether Pa Kanu and Pa Jamil were obligated
to comply with Pa Lansana's request for payment for the use of his farmland.
To put the weight of the fines in perspective, the minimum wage for a day
laborer in Sierra Leone is 21,000 Leones (U.S.D. $7.92) per month.
What is Pa Lansana to do? His family was already facing a financial
crisis; he is now nearly penniless. Pa Roke flagrantly violated the Local
Courts Act's prohibition of chiefs' courts, but Pa Roke is the paramount chief.
No one in the chiefdom, including the local court chairman, dares question his
authority.
2. Police Brutality Against a Civilian
"Kadiatu T." is a woman in her thirties with simple clothes and a
weathered face who lives in Clinetown, a neighborhood in the east of
Freetown. She sells cigarettes and occasionally sex to make a living. In
September 2004, a drunk off-duty police officer near the Clinetown police
station asked Kadiatu T. to give him a cigarette on credit. Kadiatu T. gave him
the cigarette. The officer then asked for a plastic bag. She said she did not
have any. At this point, the officer started to beat her. She tried to walk away;
he then beat and kicked her in the back, mouth, and belly until she was
unconscious. Bystanders then had the heartlessness to steal her money and the
stock of cigarettes she had been carrying atop her head.
Kadiatu T.'s boyfriend borrowed money from friends and relatives to
pay for her medical treatment. The two of them approached the Complaints
Discipline and Internal Investigations Department (CDIID) at police
headquarters in Freetown and filed a complaint against the officer. They
checked in at the department every week, but after a month, the department
had taken no action. The CDIID representative only stated to Kadiatu T. and
her boyfriend that the Department was "looking into the matter."11
Kadiatu T. was most interested in compensation for her medical care and
the loss of her money and wares, but she was losing hope. The officer,
meanwhile, continued to work in the Clinetown station, unchecked and
unapologetic. Kadiatu T. was told that he laughed to people in the area: "What
does she think she can do to me?" There is a phrase in Krio, the lingua franca
of Sierra Leone, na fo biya no mo-"one should bear, nothing more." The
people around Kadiatu T. were saying this to her at this point, in October
11. In general, the cases discussed in this Essay are based on my direct interaction with
clients, my conversations with paralegals, and our case files. In some instances, I reproduce dialogue.
When I do not use quotation marks, I am paraphrasing (sometimes on the basis of a secondhand
account) rather than quoting directly.
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2004: You are powerless. You should bear the suffering life has dealt you and
move on and forget and survive.
3. An Abandoned Woman, Accused of Witchcraft
"Macie B." is a twenty-six year-old woman from Guala Village,
Bumpeh-Gao Chiefdom, in the south of Sierra Leone. When I met her in April
2005, she was taciturn and in the seventh month of her fourth pregnancy. Her
first and second children both died at around one year of age. When her third
child also became sick during his second year, her husband and her husband's
family brought her to visit a diviner. The diviner declared that he believed
Macie B. had something in her mind and that a confession from her could
save the child's life. During a ceremony with intense questioning, Macie B.
confessed to being a witch. She explained that in a dream she had made an
agreement with a coven of witches that each would offer a close relative to be
sacrificed. She said she had given her first two children to this circle of
witches in a dream before their deaths and that she had recently given her
third child to the same witches in a dream as well.
On hearing this, Macie B.'s husband and her husband's family wanted
nothing to do with her. They refused to spend more money on her or the
child's healthcare, and they sent her to live with her parents. Within a few
weeks, the third child also died. The husband and his family claimed that this
third death proved the veracity of Macie B.'s confession. By this point, Macie
B. was already pregnant for the fourth time. Her own family viewed her with
suspicion and was reluctant to take her in. In April 2005, at seven months
pregnant, she had not yet visited a clinic for an ante-natal appointment for lack
of money, and she was not receiving enough to eat. She claimed that her
confession was made under great pressure and was untrue. She said she
wanted to take care of her health and the health of the baby she was carrying,
but both her own family and her husband's family had turned away from her.
I offer these three disparate stories as examples of the kinds of justice
problems that poor Sierra Leoneans face. Where should these people turn?
What would it take to protect human rights in these situations? Before
considering these questions, I want to sketch some features of the context out
of which these stories arise.
B. Context
Sierra Leone comprises some 30,000 square miles and about five million
people in the middle of the Mano River Basin, south and west of Guinea and
north of Liberia. The country emerged in 2002 from an eleven-year civil war
that involved the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF), multiple
factions and incarnations of the Sierra Leonean Army, several civilian defense
forces and, near its end, West African and U.N. peacekeeping troops.
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There is not space here for a systematic treatment of Sierra Leone's history, or
even the history of the civil war. More modestly, I would like to highlight four
dimensions of the historical and institutional context, all of which, I believe,
must be reckoned with by any attempt to improve the justice situation of the
Sierra Leonean poor.
1. The Rule of Big Persons and the Patrimonial State
Paul Richards describes the Sierra Leonean state as "patrimonial":
Patrimonialism involves redistributing national resources as marks of personal favour to
followers who respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the institution the leader
represents. . . . In patrimonial systems of government "big persons" at the apex of
political power compete to command some share of the "national cake" which they then
redistribute through their own networks of followers. 12
Among themselves, and even in the newspapers, Sierra Leoneans refer
to President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as di pa-"the father." They speak of the
other ministers, and leaders in general, as di big man dem, "the big men." My
barber Ahmed Koroma begins his laments about corruption this way: di big
man dem no lek we. "The big men don't like us." State failure, in Ahmed's
eyes, is personal.
It is not only the apex of the Sierra Leonean state that these big persons
inhabit. Power is concentrated in the hands of big persons at every level, from
Pa Kabbah down to the village chief, the school principal, the head of the
village farmers' association. Richards writes that patrimonialism "is a
systematic scaling up, at the national level, of local ideas about patron-client
linkages, shaped (in Sierra Leone) in the days of direct extraction of forest
resources, about the duty of the rich and successful to protect, support and
promote their followers and friends."
' 13
"Big person" is the literal translation of phrases in both Temne and
Mende (the two most-widely spoken African languages in Sierra Leone): an
fem a bana in Temne and kpako in Mende. 14 The relationship between big
persons and the constituencies who depend on them has been shaped, like
anything else, by history. Three hundred years of trans-Atlantic slave trade
and almost one hundred years of what the British called "legitimate trade,"
while internal slavery was still practiced, increased the dependency of
ordinary Sierra Leoneans on their chiefs, as people looked to their leaders to
protect them from incessant wars and slave raids. The same wars and raids
12. PAUL RIcHARDs, FIGHTING FOR THE RAINFOREST 34-35 (1996).
13. Id.
14. A word on gender: in both Temne and Mende, the phrase used for "big person" is gender
neutral. In the government and much of public life, most big persons are men. There is an occasional
woman paramount chief in the south and the local elections in 2004 set quotas for women district
council members, but the longest standing locus for "big women" is the leadership positions of the
women's societies, such as Sande (Mende land) and Bondo (Temne land), which exist in virtually every
community in Sierra Leone.
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and the massive social upheaval of that period, meanwhile, rendered the
protection chiefs could offer less dependable.
5
During the colonial period, which began in 1896 when Britain extended
its reign beyond the settlement of Freetown to what are now the provinces of
Sierra Leone, local big men were used as a part of the colonial strategy of
indirect rule. Indirect rule provided the primary answer to the "native
question" of how a tiny foreign minority could rule over a large indigenous
majority. The kernel of that strategy was to rule rural Africa by proxy. This
meant, first, subjecting African chiefs to colonial authority, and, second,
enhancing the power of those chiefs over their own people.
16
While the colonialists transformed chiefs from sovereign but limited
kings into colonial agents, they simultaneously "put chieftaincy out of the
reach of traditional sanctions" such as the right of subjects to depose their
chiefs. 17 Arthur Abraham, writing about Mende land, concludes, "[tihe
traditional democratic basis of Mende chiefship was radically undermined."'
18
As a result, chiefs not only carried out colonial demands but also practiced
their own exploitation by way of excessive fines, forced labor, and arbitrary
decisions.'
9
Mahmood Mamdani, contemplating the continent as a whole, claims that
the legacy of indirect rule is a despotic African countryside, in which too
much power is concentrated in the hands of chiefs. Independent African
states, the inheritors of colonial authority, have failed to confront-indeed
have often taken advantage of-this legacy of despotism. 20 Paramount chiefs
in Sierra Leone were once told during colonialism that "his Majesty must be
regarded . . . as the Paramount Chief over all Paramount Chiefs.', 21 Post-
colonial Sierra Leonean presidents have overtaken exactly this role: the father
of all the fathers, each with a strong hold over his respective dependents.
Obvious tensions exist between a system of layered, personalized,
authoritarian patrimonialism and both the democratic principle that ordinary
people ought to have power over their own lives and the legal principle that
social life ought to be governed by fair and consistent rules rather than
personal fiat or ties of loyalty and dependency. But it would be neither useful
nor easy to cast broad judgment on this element of Sierra Leone's political
culture. I also do not suggest that patrimonialism is unique to Sierra Leone or
to Africa; to the contrary, it would be difficult to identify a society in which
15. See generally La Ray Denzer, Sierra Leone-Bai Bureh, in WEST AFRICAN RESISTANCE:
THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO COLONIAL OCCUPATION 233 (Michael Crowder ed., 1971).
16. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SuBJECr: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE
LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 62-137 (1996).
17. ARTHUR ABRAHAM, MENDE GOVERNMENT AND POLrrICS UNDER COLONIAL RULE: A
HISTORICAL STUDY OF POLrnCAL CHANGE IN SIERRA LEONE 1890-1937, at 303 (1978).
18. Id. at 305. Rosalind Shaw, writing about Temne land, argues similarly: "In relation to the
[colonial] government itself [the chiefs'] powers had been curtailed .... But at the same time the checks
and balances that had formerly curbed abuses of chiefly power over their subjects were gone."
ROSALIND SHAW, MEMORIES OF THE SLAVE TRADE 236 (2002).
19. See, e.g., Vernon R. Dorjahn, The Changing Political System of the Temne, 30 AFR. J.
INT'L INST. 110, 130-35 (1960).
20. See MAMDANI, supra note 16, at 62-108.
21. MILAN KALOUS, CANNIBALS AND TONGO PLAYERS OF SIERRA LEONE 280 (1974).
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patrimonialism in some form is not present. I only posit that any attempt to
succor justice in Sierra Leone must ask itself how it will grapple with the rule
of big persons.
2. The Dualist Legal Structure
Law in Sierra Leone, like that in many African countries, is bifurcated: a
formal legal system based on that of the former colonial master (in this case
England) coexists with a "customary" legal regime that is derived from
traditional approaches to justice.
The 1896 ordinance that first made Sierra Leone a British protectorate
established courts of the native chiefs.22 The same institutions are legally
recognized today, though renamed "local courts," as arbiters of customary
law. Reforms in the late colonial period replaced paramount chiefs with courtS 23
chairmen as the heads of these courts, but those chairmen are still appointed
by paramount chiefs for approval by the local government ministry. In
practice, customary law is also administered by lesser village and section
chiefs, although these are not recognized by statute. Customary law varies by
tribe and is not codified.
The formal legal system, meanwhile, is concentrated in Freetown, the
nation's capital. Of a total of ten magistrates at this writing, five sit in
Freetown while the other five rotate among twelve provincial magistrate
courts. Of twelve high court judges, ten presently sit in Freetown while one
sits in the southern provincial capital, Bo, and another is assigned to rotate
among the provinces. There are only about one hundred practicing lawyers in
the country, and more than ninety of those lawyers are based in Freetown.
Most chiefdoms have branch offices of the Sierra Leone national police
in addition to "chiefdom police" officers who serve the customary institutions.
Law requires that crimes punishable by more than six months' imprisonment
and civil matters involving large sums of money24 be dealt with by the formal
courts, though such jurisdictional boundaries are not always respected.
Different countries have approached legal dualism in different ways
since independence. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah abolished chiefs' courts
because he saw traditional rulers as a challenge to his authority. Customary
law was integrated into a unitary legal code. 25 In South Africa, where the
rulers of the homelands were closely associated with the apartheid regime, the
relevance of customary law shrunk drastically after 1994. In Sierra Leone,
however, the customary legal system continues to have far more practical
22. ABRAHAM, supra note 17, at 126.
23. RICHARDS, supra note 12, at 46.
24. The Local Courts Act is outdated; it states the limit on the value of local court civil suits in
British Pounds. The present limit on civil cases in magistrate court is 1,000,000 Leones (U.S.D.
$377.36), so local courts certainly should not hear cases worth that much. A committee has been
convened to draft a "Customary Law Act" which will replace the Local Courts Act and, among other
things, specify jurisdictional limitations in the national currency. Interview with Mofred Sesay,
Customary Law Officer, in Bo, Sierra Leone (March 14, 2006).
25. See MAMDAi, supra note 16, at 131 (arguing that Ghana's integration was formal rather
than substantive).
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relevance for the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans than the formal legal
system.
Substantively, customary law sometimes conflicts with what some
consider to be human rights. In certain tribes, a girl can be betrothed without
her consent before she reaches puberty. 26 Women are also generally
disallowed from inheriting family property. Customary law is supposed to
comply with the national constitution and it should not, according to the 1963
Local Courts Act, contradict "enactments of parliament" or "principles of
natural justice and equity. ' '28 But these nominal limitations are seldom if ever
enforced.
Moreover, customary law is often applied unfairly. Favoritism and
excessive fines are common. In Bumpeh-Gao Chiefdom in the Southern
Province, I watched two 10,000 Leone (U.S.D. $3.77) fines levied against the
same witness-someone who was in principle assisting the court in its work-
within the course of half an hour. The reason was that the witness spoke a
one-word answer to a question asked of him before the court clerk had
finished recording the question in his languid handwriting.
Among the causes of both substantive and procedural unfairness is a
lack of independent review. Within the chiefdom, few but the paramount chief
and the elders he favors have any power over the way the local courts
function. This may be symptomatic of the concentration of power discussed
above. There is a theoretical right to appeal from local courts into the formal
legal system, but in practice such appeals are quite rare. There are also three
"customary law officers" in the country, lawyers working in the Attorney
General's office, who have the power to supervise local court chairmen and
review local court decisions. This form of review may not qualify as
independent because the law officers are members of the executive rather than
judicial branch. Even assuming adequate independence, the same men double
as the only public prosecutors working in the formal courts in the provinces-
and their time is stretched thin.
The notion of "legal services" is an offspring of the British common law
tradition. 29 Providing an analogous service in the circumstance of legal
dualism in a place like Sierra Leone requires a re-imagination of what legal
services might mean.
3. The Persistence of Violence
Both the three-hundred-year trans-Atlantic slave trade and the
"legitimate trade" in the nineteenth century fueled and were fueled by
26. H.M. Jco SMART, StERRA LEONE CUSTOMARY FAMIL LAw 33 (1983). Customary law is
always evolving and it is unfortunate that this is the most recent research available. But we know from
field experience that both of the practices mentioned here are still common.
27. Id. at 196.
28. See Local Courts Act, 1963 (Sierra Leone) § 2.
29. See Joan Mahoney, Legal Services: Green Forms and Legal Aid Offices: A History of
Publicly Funded Legal Services in Britain and the United States, 17 ST. LOuiS U. PUB. L. REv. 223, 226
(1998) (discussing the origins of legal services).
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widespread wars and abductions in Sierra Leone. Rosalind Shaw reminds us
that it was not just those who embarked on the middle passage who suffered:
The history of the Atlantic trade, then, encompasses much more than the transatlantic
movement of people and goods in slave ships .... It also includes the vast hinterland of
violence and terror among those who remained on the African side of the Atlantic and
were never taken as slaves, but who lived for centuries with both the anticipation and the
consequences of the warfare, raiding, and other means of enslavement that the Atlantic
trade engendered and multiplied.30
Only about a hundred years have passed since those four hundred years
of terror. Mariane Ferme argues that contemporary Mende social interactions,
even in peacetime-her fieldwork was conducted in the 1980s--deliberately
invoke various forms of secrecy and "a hermeneutic of ambiguity," in part out
of the historical need to survive the continuous possibility of violence.
That possibility erupted into actual, sustained brutality during the
eleven-year civil war. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC), collecting voluntary statements with limited resources and time,
recorded some 40,000 human rights violations against civilians, including
4,500 killings and 6,000 abductions. 32 Analysts of the war agree that violence
committed against civilians far exceeded the losses suffered by any of the
belligerent parties. Human Rights Watch and others have shown that sexual
violence of extraordinary brutality was committed systematically by various
parties to the conflict, especially the RUF, as a weapon of terror. 33 The
majority of combatants were Sierra Leoneans,34 tens of thousands of whom
still live in the country.
35
The United Nations' demobilization and disarmament program
endeavored to remove from Sierra Leone some of the physical machinery of
violence from Sierra Leone. That process may have succeeded, but it was
inevitably incomplete. 36 The culture of violence may prove even more
persistent. After eleven years of fighting, Ferme's observation is, if anything,
more accurate: violence lies just beneath the surface of everyday life. Too
30. SHAW, supra note 18, at 32.
31. MARIANE FERME, THE UNDERNEATH OF THINGS: VIOLENCE, HISTORY, AND THE EVERYDAY
IN SIERRA LEONE 20 (2001).
32. 2 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, WITNESS TO TRUTH 1 87
(2004). The TRC numbers are based on statements taken and do not represent projections for the overall
population. A study sponsored by the American Bar Association will make estimates of total violations
that took place; its results are not available at this writing.
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WE'LL KILL You IF You CRY: SEXuAL VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA
LEONE CONFLICT 25-26 (2003).
34. SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, supra note 32, 75.
35. Some 72,000 ex-combatants completed the UN's disarmament program. INTERNATIONAL
CRISIS GROUP, SIERRA LEONE AFTER ELECTIONS: POLrrICS AS USUAL? 13 (2002).
36. See Disarmament and Rehabilitation Completed After Five Years, IRINnews.org (U.N.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (Feb. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?reportlD=39305 ("[A] World Bank representative.., pointed out that
[Sierra Leone] 'is considered as the best practice example throughout the world of a successful
disarmament demobilization reintegration programme."'). But see, e.g., Olu Gordon, Choosing
Development Over Guns in Sierra Leone, CHOICES, Dec. 2004 (quoting a United Nations Development
Program staff member as saying, "[a]lthough the demobilization and disarmament process ... took over
30,000 weapons away from ex-combatants ... there were many small arms still floating around in the
various communities.").
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frequently it surfaces, in a dispute between husband and wife, in a fight
between poda poda37 drivers, in a policeman's confrontation with a street
vendor like Kadiatu T. Addressing the consequences and, ideally, the causes
of this violence is a critical challenge for those who would take on the justice
problems of the Sierra Leonean poor.
4. A Failed Social Infrastructure
Of those Sierra Leoneans who went to war, many did so out of their
disaffection with an ineffective, unequal social infrastructure. 38 Eleven years
of civil war made a bad thing much worse. In name, Sierra Leone possesses
the complete anatomy of a modern state-ministries of health, education, and
welfare, a transit authority, a police force-but each organ is profoundly
dysfunctional. The United Nations Development Program ranks countries
according to an aggregation of data on health, education, and standards of
living; as of 2004, Sierra Leone was last on the list of 177 countries. 9
Sierra Leone's failed social infrastructure is in a reciprocally causal
relationship with its poor economy. Terrible roads render markets difficult to
access. Terrible health and education systems create a shortage of healthy,
educated economic actors. A lack of economic development, in turn, leaves
the government with minimal resources and leaves the majority of people too
poor to fulfill their basic needs. Despite the country's considerable mineral
wealth, Sierra Leone's per capita gross national income is among the bottom
10 of 208 countries ranked by the World Bank, and Sierra Leone is classified
as "severely indebted."4 Seventy per cent of Sierra Leoneans live below the
poverty line determined by the Sierra Leone government.41
Corruption is an operating principle for the patrimonial state, and
massive corruption in Sierra Leone kindles both economic and social-
structural failure. The government itself, hand-held by some of its donors,
conducted a study in 2004 to track the flow of state resources. The study
found that of 1.7 billion Leones' (U.S.D. $641,500) worth of essential
medicines supposedly transferred from the central government to district
hospitals, only ninety-six million Leones' (U.S.D. $36,200) worth of drugs
were actually reported received at the district level. Some 94.3% of the drugs
disappeared without explanation! Another one billion Leones of essential
medicines was nominally transferred to district medical officers for the
purpose of distribution to peripheral health units in the rural areas. In this case
90.6% of the drugs were missing at the district level. Of the remaining 9.4%,
37. "Poda poda" is the Sierra Leonean name for the mini-vans used for public transport which
are found all over Africa.
38. See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 12, at 60.
39. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PRoGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 179 (2004).
40. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DATABASE (2005). I am referring to
the "purchasing power parity" calculation of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, according to
which Sierra Leone was 201st out of 208, though there are several low-income countries that are not
ranked. If GNI per capita is calculated by the "Atlas method," Sierra Leone is ranked 198 out of 208.
41. STATISTICS SIERRA LEONE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL DIGEST, SIERRA LEONE INTEGRATED
HOuSEHOLD SURVEY (2003/2004).
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another 45% went missing in the transfer from district medical officers to the
peripheral health units. Not accounting for corruption and theft at the level of
the peripheral health units themselves, rural people received at most 5% of
42what was originally intended for them.
For most Sierra Leoneans, these severe conditions make injustice a part
of every lived day.
C. Intervention
This picture demands several kinds of change. One need is for serious
reforms to the state institutions: to rein in state corruption, democratize
political power, construct a more effective social infrastructure, and engage
some of the contradictions in the dualist legal regime. The bulk of post-war
reconstruction efforts have fallen into this broad category, with assistance
from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations
Development Program, and the British, American, European, and other
governments.
The premise of our work in Sierra Leone is that there is also an urgent
need for justice efforts on the other side of the lines of power: efforts which
work directly with poor Sierra Leoneans. If successful at all, macrocosmic
progress is slow. People like Pa Lansana, Kadiatu T., and Macie B. suffer in
the meanwhile, and one simple reason to undertake justice work with common
Sierra Leoneans is to assist people like them; to tend to those wounded by a
broken system not yet fixed. A second reason-one that conceives of people
like Pa Lansana as agents rather than victims-is that lasting institutional
change depends on a more empowered polity. Justice services for the poor can
hope to contribute to the process of reform from below.43
If justice services for the poor are a worthy priority, what should they
look like in this distinctive context? Criminal legal aid would involve too
narrow a swath of the justice problems people encounter. Some human rights
organizations in the country undertake a mixture of education and advocacy
activities, but they tend to lack an understanding of law and government, and,
relatedly, they tend to lack a rigorous method with which to approach ordinary
people's problems. The broader conception of "community legal services" is
more attractive: applying the rigor of legal practice to the wide range of
justice problems communities face.
Lawyers, however, are hard to come by. There are only about one
hundred practicing lawyers in the country, and more than ninety of those are
42. SIERRA LEONE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, REPORT OF THE PUBLIC EXPENDrrURE TRACKING
SURVEY (PETS) FOR FINANCIAL YEAR 2002 SELEcrE ExPENDrruREs 31-33, U 63-66 (2004). This data
was for the year 2002. District medical officers reported transferring more drugs than the amount which
they reported receiving from the central government; this was due to donations at the district-level by
NGOs and charities. My estimate that peripheral health centers received five percent of the drugs
originally intended for them assumes that the rate of discrepancy applied equally to both sources.
43. This sort of work fits into what Stephen Golub calls "the legal empowerment paradigm."
GOLUB, supra note 1, at 25 ("Legal empowerment is the use of legal services and related development
activities to increase disadvantaged populations' control over their lives."). Golub argues that efforts to
enhance the rule of law should balance a focus on state institutions with attention to legal empowerment.
Id. at 3, 25.
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located in the capital Freetown. The Lawyers' Center for Legal Assistance,
based in Freetown, provides much-needed legal assistance to indigent clients,
but the Center is unable to meet demand-suggesting the need for more legal
aid-and its activities are largely limited to Freetown and provincial
headquarter towns. Moreover, under Sierra Leone's dualist legal structure,
lawyers are barred from practicing in the customary courts; yet these are the
institutions of most practical relevance to the majority of Sierra Leoneans. For
these reasons, and based on our experiences in the field, the Sierra Leonean
National Forum for Human Rights (NFHR) and the Open Society Justice
Initiative [hereinafter Justice Initiative] collaborated to initiate a program to
deliver basic justice services at the chiefdom level through a frontline of
community-based paralegals. This program is now called Timap for Justice.
44
The program drew inspiration from South Africa. Community-based
paralegals first emerged there during the anti-apartheid struggle, and have
since grown into a nationwide movement that is widely respected as a
frontline provider of legal services to poor South Africans. Paralegals in South
Africa are now working toward statutory recognition of their profession and
national accreditation of their training process.
Sierra Leone, as we have seen, is quite a different context, and Timap
for Justice takes an experimental approach to its work. The program began on
a small scale in order to focus on the development and refinement of its
methods. NFHR and the Justice Initiative decided to focus their efforts in the
countryside, where the social infrastructure is thinnest and the need for
services is greatest. After discussions with chiefdom authorities and
community members, five chiefdoms were selected: three in Bo District in the
South and two in Tonkolili District in the North.45 Simeon Koroma, a Sierra
Leonean lawyer, and I, an American-trained lawyer, served as program
directors, engaging first in informal community needs assessments in each
chiefdom. These assessments aimed to identify justice problems and to begin
to flesh out exactly what role paralegals could play. Findings from the
assessments helped us to shape the first paralegal training program.
The needs assessments revealed justice problems that arise between
ordinary chiefdom residents, such as domestic violence and child
abandonment, as well as justice problems that arise between the people and
their authorities, such as favoritism by customary officials and corruption in
government services.
The paralegals were recruited and hired from the chiefdoms where they
now work. Initially there were thirteen paralegals in all: two in each of the
44. This change in name came about in 2005, when the paralegal program jointly initiated by
NFHR and the Justice Initiative became an independent Sierra Leonean organization. 'Timap" is Krio
for "stand up" or, in some cases, "team up."
45. Sierra Leone comprises three provinces, twelve districts, and 149 chiefdoms. According to
the provisional results of the 2004 census, 350,281 people (7% of Sierra Leone's population) live in the
five chiefdoms in which we have paralegal offices. 772,873 people (15.5% of Sierra Leone's
population) live in the urban district of the Western Area, in which our head office and Freetown
paralegals are located. See STATIsTIcs SIERRA LEONE, PROVISIONAL RESULTS: 2004 POPULATION AND
HouSING CENSUS (2005), available at http://www.daco-sl.orglencyclopedia/5-gov/5_4/Statistics%20
Sierra%20Leone/pro-resultcensus.pdf.
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five chiefdoms; one more in Bumpeh-Gao Chiefdom, which is exceptionally
large; and two who work in the headquarter office in Freetown. 46 They all
have at least a secondary school education, and a few have university degrees.
At the outset they participated in an intensive two-week training in law, the
workings of government, and paralegal skills. They also learn on the job;
directors continue to train and supervise the paralegals as the work goes on.
The substantive directions of the program are determined by the specific
problems that clients and community members bring to our offices. Common
issues we address include domestic violence, child abandonment, corruption,
police abuse, economic exploitation, abuse of traditional authority,
employment rights, right to education, and right to health.
The methods by which the paralegals work are diverse. For individual
justice-related problems (e.g., a woman is beaten by her husband or a juvenile
is wrongfully detained), the paralegals provide information on rights and
procedures, mediate conflicts, and assist clients in dealing with government
and chiefdom authorities. For community-level problems (e.g., domestic
violence is prevalent in the community or a police department has adopted a
policy of detaining juveniles with adults), they engage in community
education and dialogue, advocate for change with both traditional and formal
authorities, and organize community members to undertake collective action.
The paralegals and the program as a whole straddle the dualist legal system,
drawing on and engaging both customary and formal institutions depending
on the needs of a given case. In a small number of cases, chosen either
because the injustice is particularly severe or because of the possibility of
legal impact, the coordinating lawyers provide direct legal representation or
high-level advocacy.
In an effort to ensure the program's accountability to its host
communities, we have established "community oversight boards" (COBs) in
every chiefdom where we work. The boards are made up of community
leaders and are charged with monitoring the paralegals' work and ensuring
that the program is well-serving the needs of the chiefdom. Candidates for the
COBs are appointed by community members and paramount chiefs and
approved by the program directors. Every COB includes at least one woman
and one youth representative. The board members meet directly with the
program's directors to provide feedback on paralegal performance.
The paralegals' caseloads have risen as the character and quality of our
work has become known within our host communities. By June 2005, each of
our eight offices (Bumpeh and Tikonko chiefdoms have two offices each) was
handling an average of twenty new cases (including both individual and
community-level problems) per month.47
46. Though the bulk of our work is in Sierra Leone's provinces, we have a headquarter office
in Freetown. This is necessitated by the legal nature of our work and the fact that the Sierra Leonean
legal system is heavily concentrated in the capital. There is no law library outside of Freetown, for
example, and all but two of the high court judges sit in Freetown.
47. Timap for Justice Case Records Database (on file with Timap for Justice).
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Those are the broad outlines of our program; I will now try to convey
something of the texture of our work by returning to the three individuals with
whom I began. All three were clients of ours.
D. Three Justice Problems Revisited
1. Pa Lansana
After spending his last Leone paying fines to the acting paramount chief,
Pa Lansana approached our paralegal office. Paralegal Michael Luseni
introduced himself and the program, and explained briefly his role as a
paralegal. He listened to Pa Lansana's story and recorded it in the form of a
statement which he read back to Pa Lansana before the Pa pressed an inked
thumb on the paper. Michael consulted his notes and offered his client some
legal facts. Michael spoke in Krio. First, Pa Roke's actions violated the Local
Courts Act, which prohibits chiefs from constituting courts.48 Second, the law
creates avenues for redress in the event of unfairness in the customary courts.
One possibility would be to appeal the case to the district appeal court;
another possibility would be to approach the customary law officer.
Just learning these facts changed Pa Lansana's understanding of his
predicament. He hadn't heard of a customary law officer or a right to appeal;
he hadn't known there was law on his side. Pa Lansana asked Michael what
action he would advise. Michael gave Pa Lansana a day and time to return to
the office. Barring emergencies, we ask our paralegals to try to independently
investigate the facts that clients report before they take action. Michael met
with the local court chairman, who confirmed that the case had been removed
improperly from his court. The chairman was indignant at the violation of
process but fearful of challenging the chief.
When Pa Lansana returned, Michael discussed with him his options. He
could file an appeal into the formal court system, but that might be difficult
without a lawyer. Michael himself could not file such an appeal. Second, Pa
Lansana could try to approach the customary law officer. At the time, only
one customary law officer (a lawyer working in the Attorney General's office)
covered all the customary courts in the country and acted as the only public49
prosecutor in the formal courts in the provinces. Michael knew it would not
be easy to get the officer's attention. But the officer has a "local court
supervisor" based in the district, a soporific, elderly gentleman who has no
power of review himself but who has occasional access to his boss. Michael
offered to draft a letter to the customary law officer, meet with the local court
supervisor together with Pa Lansana, and advocate with the local court
supervisor to call the customary law officer's attention to the matter. Pa
Lansana was enthusiastic. He felt he was starting to have a fighting chance.
I edited Michael's letter before he met the local court supervisor. I was
somewhat skeptical that the customary law officer would pay attention, and
48. See Local Courts Act, 1963 (Sierra Leone) § 40.
49. The government assigned two more customary law officers in 2005.
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offered to take up the issue with him directly if Michael's efforts failed.50 But
Michael's efforts succeeded. He managed to awaken the local court supervisor
to the implications of this breach of process; the supervisor in turn raised the
issue with the customary law officer when the officer visited the district in
November 2004. Both officer and supervisor visited the chief. The chief,
faced with a government lawyer from Freetown, a bigger-that is, more
powerful-person than himself, agreed to send the case back to the local court
and even refunded some of the money Pa Lansana had paid in fines. For a
chief to change his stance or to return fines was unheard of. Pa Lansana was
moved.
The local court chairman also visited our office to thank Michael for
protecting the integrity of the institution he ran. Michael, meanwhile, paid a
diplomatic visit to Pa Roke to ensure that their relations were not severely
damaged. We work hard to cultivate positive relationships with paramount
chiefs, and challenging one is a delicate business. An angry paramount chief
could shut one of our offices down in one day. Pa Roke knew that Michael
had advised Pa Lansana, but Michael's exact role was never made clear.
Michael has profound resources of humility, and on this occasion he dug deep.
Pa Roke accepted Michael's implicit request for no-hard-feelings. Michael
ended his involvement there, but later recorded in his file that Pa Lansana
went on to win in the underlying matter before the local court.
One felicitous corollary effect of this case was to remind a bureaucrat of
the reason he used to care about his work. The local court supervisor in
Magburaka once served as a local court clerk himself and possesses a talent
for the nuances of the customary legal system. He is also an underpaid civil
servant with little power who has watched the country languish under
administration after feckless administration. His present listlessness is,
perhaps, understandable. His efforts in this case, however, reminded him that
he can play an important role, and seem to have rejuvenated some of his
enthusiasm. Pa Lansana, for his part, now knows that the local court
supervisor and the customary law officer exist, and his friends will no doubt
find out as well when they hear Pa Lansana tell his story. With a measure of
legal knowledge, a well-drafted letter, and some tactful advocacy, Michael
scored a small victory against the supremacy of paramount chiefs and a small
enlivening of the relationship between Sierra Leoneans and their government.
2. Kadiatu T.
Kadiatu T.'s boyfriend was already a client of ours. After a month of
opacity and inaction from the police internal disciplinary department, the two
of them came to our office in Freetown. Our paralegal Jow Williams listened
to Kadiatu T.'s story, recorded her statement, and assured her that if indeed
she was beaten in the way she described, then the officer had committed a
serious violation of the law and a serious breach of appropriate police
50. In addition to launching the independent paralegal program, the Justice Initiative and
NFHR agreed in 2004 to work with the government of Sierra Leone to provide the first training for local
officials since 1982. For this reason, I am acquainted with the customary law officer.
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conduct. He gave her a time to return to the office. Jow began investigating to
develop an objective understanding of the facts. His interviews at the station
and in the neighborhood generally confirmed Kadiatu T.'s story, including the
officer's bravado after the incident.
Jow wrote a letter on our letterhead to invite the police officer to our
office. The letter recounted the allegations and stated that, if true, they were
quite serious. The letter asked the officer to visit our office so that we could
hear his side of the story. As I will discuss in more detail below, a letter from
the "human rights" office holds power for many Sierra Leoneans. The officer
reported to our office with a humble disposition and, after some discussion,
conceded his wrongdoing. Jow informed him that the offense was severe, that
we would monitor the proceedings in the police disciplinary board, and that,
depending on the outcome, we would consider the possibility of private
prosecution and a civil suit for damages. The officer was afraid and ostensibly
contrite. Was there anything he could do to settle the matter? Jow said he
would discuss things with Kadiatu T. and get back to the officer.
But events moved forward before Jow could speak with Kadiatu T. After
leaving our office, the officer approached senior officers in his area to "beg
for him" to Kadiatu T. To "beg" in Sierra Leonean culture is to acknowledge
wrongdoing and ask for forgiveness. In instances of a serious rift it is common
to beg through mutually respected intermediaries. At a meeting in the police
station during the day, Kadiatu T. accepted the senior officers' pleading on the
officer's behalf, the officer's own apology, and a promise that the officer
would pay her 138,000 Leones (U.S.D. $52), which is no small sum in Sierra
Leone. She also agreed to drop her complaint with the internal disciplinary
board of the police. We did not find out about the deal until Kadiatu T. came
to our office the following week to report that the officer had paid only part of
the money he had promised. Jow spoke to the senior officers who had acted as
intermediaries. They, in turn, spoke to the officer himself and the balance of
the money was eventually paid.
Was justice done? The client received what she wanted most:
compensation for her losses. But one might argue that a police officer had
managed to buy impunity for an illegal and vicious act. On the other hand, our
paralegals and Kadiatu T. insist that it is a rare and remarkable thing for
several police officers to publicly "beg" forgiveness from a poor, female
cigarette-seller. It was fear of the human rights office and not the police
discipline board-which had taken no action on the complaint-that led to
this apology and settlement. Jow, who used to live in Clinetown himself, says
that people in the neighborhood paid great attention, and that it is a poor and
small neighborhood where word travels fast. Jow met with the officer once
more to warn him to never commit such an act again.
At some point we will probably take formal legal action on a case of
police brutality. But in this instance the paralegal was able to achieve
compensation for our client and a local form of justice in a short period of
time at little to no cost.
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3. Macie B.
Macie B.'s family members brought her to our office in Bumpeh town.
They spoke in high-pitched tones. What do you want us to do with this child?
She is a confessed witch. She gave three of her children to witches to be
eaten! Her husband's family has returned her to us and left the village. We do
not have money to support her; we fear her ourselves. What do you human
rights people have to say about this?
Our paralegals are trained to approach with calm the clients who arrive
distressed. Welcome to our office, please have a seat, drink this water, tell me
the problem. This time, the paralegals, Joseph Sawyer and Elizabeth Lebbie,
were at a loss. Under customary law, Macie B's confession was enough to
justify the husband's family "returning" her to her family, and also sufficient
to justify her own family if they refused to take her in. Under formal law her
family had no obligation to care for her because she was no longer a child. All
of our paralegals and the Sierra Leonean director believe deeply in witchcraft.
The Bumpeh paralegals set aside those beliefs for the moment and focused on
the principle of their occupation-the dignity of every individual. Was there
any way to keep this pregnant woman from being abandoned and outcast?
The paralegals appealed to love rather than law. They spoke in Mende.
We are happy that you came to talk to us. We have listened to everything you
have said, and we respect the seriousness of the situation. We want to remind
you, though, that this is your daughter. It was you that brought her up into this
world. If not to you she has nowhere to turn. They also tried a bit of reason:
her husband's family stopped pursuing medical help once she confessed; the
deaths may well have been due to neglect rather than witchcraft.
This sort of persuasion, gently and respectfully rendered, convinced the
family to continue to house Macie B. for the time being, but food remained
scarce in their household. The paralegals discussed the case with Simeon and
me. We, too, were at a loss. We gave a small amount of money from our
pockets so Macie B. could visit the clinic for ante-natal care and to purchase
some additional food for herself. (We hope to eventually develop a small
emergency fund in each office for such purposes.) We asked the paralegals to
stay in contact with Macie B. and to continue to encourage the family. I
suggested that once the baby was born, we could approach the husband's
family for maintenance payments, an obligation under formal law. But
Simeon and the paralegals argued that the family's strong position under
customary law would make it nearly impossible to collect.
51
One of our community oversight board members in Bumpeh Chiefdom
is a part-time diviner. She offered to prepare a meal and ceremony for Macie
B. after the birth of the child that would exorcise the witch. She assured me
that the meal of chicken and rice wouldn't harm Macie B. in any way, except
51. According to an outdated statute under formal law, the maximum maintenance payment
which the courts can enforce by law is 100 Leones per month (U.S.D. $0.04). The Bastardy Laws
Increase of Payment Act #2 (1988) (Sierra Leone). We manage to negotiate many maintenance
agreements at much higher rates through a process I will describe infra. In this case our staff members
doubted that our usual methodology would be effective.
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that it would cause some temporary diarrhea. I suspended my own skepticism
for the hope that, if Macie B. could be perceived to have been de-witched, her
own family and perhaps even her husband's family would accept her again,
and she could rejoin the fabric of her society. Here the problem did involve
human rights-Macie B.'s right to basic health and food-but the partial
solution we could offer did not involve law at all.52
Having laid out the structure of our program and narrated a few cases, I
would like to examine several conceptual and practical issues which this work
raises.
E. Characteristics and Challenges of Timap for Justice's Methodology
1. Creative Services in an Institutional Vacuum
a. Wide Range of Methods
We work in a barren institutional landscape. State institutions are poorly
functioning, understaffed, and widely corrupt. As a result we take on a much
wider range of functions than a typical legal services program would.53 For
example, villagers in Tikonko Chiefdom approached our paralegals in June
52. Postscript to Macie B.'s story: In June 2005, our paralegals helped Macie B. to bring a
case against her husband's family in local court asking that the family pay for some of the health care
costs associated with Macie B.'s pregnancy. The court chairman sided with Macie B., and in doing so
departed from the traditional rule that excuses a family from its obligation to a family member who a
diviner has declared to be a witch. Macie B.'s baby was born in July 2005 and named Betty after one of
our paralegals in Bumpeh-Gao. During Betty's first month, while Macie B. continued to live with
suspicious and extremely poor relatives, both mother and daughter were sickly, sad, and relatively silent.
The exorcism took place in August, and-along with continuous advocacy, encouragement, and material
support from our paralegals and Simeon and me-it seemed to have worked. Our COB member
prepared the special chicken and rice and Macie B. ate the meal without realizing its purpose (it was
apparently important that the subject not realize the ritual intention). Our COB member reported
success. Macie B. and her baby were re-accepted by the family of Macie B.'s husband and Macie B.
began to live (and, importantly, eat) there again harmoniously. The nurse at the Bumpe health clinic
agreed to exempt Macie B. and Betty from Sierra Leone's "cost recovery" system and provided free
treatment for their minor ailments. By October the transformation was remarkable: mother and daughter
were both healthy and full of smiles and laughter. In January 2006, however, Betty died, to the great
shock of community members, the Bumpeh-Gao paralegals, and all of us working with Timap for
Justice. Betty was not known to be sick at the time. Macie B. said that some pap (a soft rice meal fed to
babies) accidentally went up the baby's nose, and Macie B. brought the baby to the clinic in Bumpeh.
The nurse said that Betty was dead before she arrived. There was no conclusive determination of cause
of death, but the nurse believes the baby may have choked. 283 out of every 1000 children in Sierra
Leone die before the age of five, the highest child mortality rate in the world. See UNICEF, THE STATE
OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN (2006) 102-105, available at http://www.unicef.org/sowc06/pdfs/sowc06-
tablel.pdf. The community as a whole has not accused Macie B. of witchcraft. Her mother-in-law
insists, however, that Macie B. will not set foot in the family house again. Macie B. plans to leave the
village to stay with her mother in Freetown for a time. We hope to help her access vocational training of
some kind. I considered removing this story when Betty died, but I decided to leave it in. It is a reminder
that our work is like bailing water from the ocean with a small cup: if we look at the few buckets we fill,
we feel hopeful, but if we face forward the ocean of suffering is unspeakably vast.
53. Both in its methodological flexibility and in its treatment of clients as active social agents
(see infra Part I.E.4.), our approach resonates with what some lawyers working in poor communities in
the United States call a creative community problem solving approach to legal services. See, e.g., Gerald
P. Lopez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 59,
67-74 (2004); Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative,
and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 445, 448-52 (2002).
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2004 to complain that they were cut off from basic services because of the
condition of the feeder road that connected their village to the main road. In
response the Tikonko paralegals organized village residents for a day of
voluntary, collective road maintenance. Other cases which begin as child
neglect complaints result, through mediation, in a reunion between husband
and wife. Following up with the clients, the paralegals end up providing their
own form of family counseling.
b. Mediation
Mediation-wherein we seek to facilitate the voluntary settlement of
disputes-is one of our most powerful and commonly used tools. If both
parties to a conflict are interested in settlement, the paralegals conduct a
structured, six-step mediation process. The mediations include all of the
parties involved, as well as family elders or other mutually respected people
from either side to act as witnesses.
TABLE 1. MEDIATION PROCESS
Introduction Parties should approach one another with respect; mediation is
and ground voluntary. Each side tells its story.
rules
Each side tells The stories often will be long and contentious, but they should be
its story uninterrupted. The paralegal should try to keep hissing and
exclamations to a minimum.
Mediator's The paralegal provides compendiums of what has been said,
summary and identifying the key claims on either side. The paralegal introduces
provision of relevant legal facts. Some time is allocated for discussion.
legal facts
Possible Each party articulates the settlement it would like to see. The paralegal
solutions points out legal limitations where necessary. The paralegal also offers
hybrid and alternative solutions that may bridge the interests of the
two parties.
Discussing The paralegal facilitates discussion with an aim towards mutually
solutions agreeable settlement.
Reaching If parties reach an agreement, the paralegal restates the exact terms.
agreement Agreements are written up according to a standard template and are
signed by both parties as well as the witnesses. A copy is kept on file
at the office.
Our use of mediation resonates with the emphasis in customary law on
reconciliation and community cohesion rather than punishment. 54 One of the
54. See, e.g., Justice John Wuol Makec, Legal Aid and its Problems in Sudan: Proposed
Supplementary Mechanisms 5 (paper for Conference on Legal Aid in Criminal Justice in Africa,
Lilongwe, Nov. 23, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) ("One of the main objectives of
customary law is the establishment of peace and harmony between the parties and society as a whole
through compromise, conciliation, and compensation or restoration of social imbalance created by the
commission of wrong or criminal acts.").
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traditional roles of chiefs at all levels, in fact, is to help their constituents to
peacefully resolve conflicts. Chiefs are not violating the Local Courts Act if
the parties come to them voluntarily and they refrain from imposing fines or
penalties. But chiefs' courts like the ones Pa Lansana encountered are quite
common, and chiefs are often biased by bribes or by the status-bigness, as it
were---of the parties. The same is true of formal legal institutions like the
police. One police officer in Gbonkolenken Chiefdom complained to a lawyer
who came to assess our program that people in the chiefdom were taking their
problems to the "human rights" office rather than to the police force. When
asked why, the officer candidly stated: because the human rights people don't
take money.
55
We do not wish to supplant either customary or formal dispute
mechanisms. To the contrary, much of our work involves helping clients to
access and navigate both sets of institutions. But by offering a free and fair
alternative for the mediation of conflicts, we may provide healthy competition
and achieve some dilution of the authority that is presently concentrated in the
community's big persons.
It is worth considering here our use of mediation in light of concerns
raised about alternative dispute resolution in other contexts. In the United
States, critics such as Owen Fiss and Deborah R. Hensler worry that rising
emphasis on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms will detract from the
courts' important role in the public articulation of rights. 56 Strict application of
these arguments to the Sierra Leonean context would risk repeating the
mistake which Galanter and Trubek highlight in Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: presuming the relevance of an idealized liberal-legalist
conception of the role of law in society. 57 Sierra Leonean formal courts simply
do not play the rights-articulating role which Fiss and Hensler take them to
play in the United States. There is presently no system for court reporting; for
example, written judgments are circulated informally among lawyers. 58
According to one of the country's lead scholars in constitutional law, there is
only one instance in which the Supreme Court has struck a legislative
provision on constitutional grounds.5 Many controversial cases before the
Supreme Court are never heard, or heard but never decided.
60
And as I have explained, formal courts stand at quite a distance, both
literally and figuratively, from the communities in which we work. The
realistic choice for the majority of our clients is between mediation in our
55. Interview with Asha Ramgobin, Director, Human Rights Development Initiative, in
Magburaka, Sierra Leone (Mar. 16, 2005).
56. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984); Deborah R. Hensler, Our
Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Reshaping Our Legal System,
108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 196 (2003).
57. See generally Trubek & Galanter, supra note 4.
58. Court reporting did exist in the 1970s, and the Justice Sector Development Program
sponsored by the U.K. Department for International Development has plans to reinstate court reporting
in the next few years.
59. Interview with Yada Williams, advisor to Fourah Bay College Human Rights Clinic and
former professor of constitutional law (May 13, 2004).
60. Id. In 2002, for example, Yada Williams and Abdul Tejan Cole filed a constitutional
challenge to discriminatory land laws in the Supreme Court. To date the case has not been decided.
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offices and customary courts rather than between mediation and formal courts.
We have found that the word-of-mouth dissemination of the results of
mediation sessions in our offices seems to have a precedent-setting effect in
much the same way that dissemination of the oral decisions of customary
courts might have. 61 These qualifications aside, we do not believe that
mediation is the solution to every problem, and one of the paralegal's duties is
to lay out for a client all of her legal options, including use of the formal
courts. As I will explain in the next section, formal litigation is a crucial part
of our overall strategy.
Fiss, Hensler, and others also worry that alternative dispute resolution
62mechanisms disadvantage less powerful litigants. This concern is echoed in
studies of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the "developing
world." Marc Galanter and Jayanth K. Krishnan, writing about Lok Adalats
(state-sponsored "people's courts") in India, for example, and Human Rights
Watch, writing about Gacaca courts in Rwanda, find a tendency in the
respective mechanisms to bully, and insufficiently protect the rights of, their
poor participants. 63 These concerns stem in part from constraints on
participants' choice of forum. Hensler describes U.S. judges who cajole
parties into settlement; 64 Galanter and Krishnan observe a particularly 6gruff,
paternalistic version of the same tendency among Lok Adalat judges; and
Gacaca courts were the only forum available under law to some one hundred
thousand detainees accused of genocide. 66 Our mediations are both
unconnected to the state and voluntary. The admission of the candid police
officer in Gbonkolenken Chiefdom suggests that poor people choose to
approach our offices to avoid bias and barriers in the existing institutions for
dispute resolution. If anything, our mediation process might be criticized for
bias in favor of the less powerful party, because paralegals will often help that
67party to take other action if an agreement is not reached.
c. Wide Range of Justice Issues
In addition to employing unconventional tools, we handle an eclectic
range of cases, including issues as disparate as domestic violence, economic
exploitation, wrongful detention, and government corruption. Perhaps we
could gain expertise and effectiveness if we narrowed our scope. But where
existing services are so poor and critical needs are so wide-ranging,
specialization would seem irresponsible. We have chosen to take our
directions from the justice needs of the communities in which we work.
61. This perception is based on experience and conversations with community members; we
hope to test it more rigorously in the future.
62. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 56, at 176.
63. See, e.g., HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003, at 63 (2003); Marc Galanter &
Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Bread for the Poor": Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 789 (2004).
64. Hensler, supra note 56, at 175.
65. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 63, at 816-20.
66. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 63, at 63.
67. I plan to develop this theme-the use of mediation, an ostensibly neutral vehicle, as a
component of what are ultimately non-neutral justice efforts-in a future article.
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We have not set any strict limitations on the kinds of problems with
which people may approach us. We are open to considering whatever
community members perceive to be justice issues. Paralegals determine their
level of involvement, however, based on 1) whether they consider a
significant justice issue to be raised, and 2) whether they are capable of taking
useful action. Paralegal involvement in a given case can vary from the mere
provision of information to extended, multi-forum advocacy. If someone
approaches the office regarding a bitter family dispute over land, for example,
in which the parties are unwilling to mediate, and the paralegal does not
identify any exploitation or abuse of process, the paralegal would likely offer
information about legal procedures and perhaps a referral to a private lawyer;
the paralegal would not likely take up the issue further in terms of advocacy or
negotiation. One of the duties of the community oversight boards is to help
evaluate whether the paralegals show sound discretion in the way they
distribute their time and energy across cases.
2. The Color of Law
Many Sierra Leoneans, especially rural Sierra Leoneans, perceive the
legal system and the government in a way not unlike the way they perceive
the workings of black magic: as things to be feared rather than understood.
We hope to demystify these things; by educating people about them, by
guiding people through them, and, most importantly, by proving that law and
government can be made to serve ordinary citizens.
We may risk inconsistency, however, for we also make strategic use of
the awe with which the law is perceived. Though we do not possess statutory
authority, we have found that just the color of law-"human rights"
identification cards around our staff members' necks, typed letters on
letterhead in a society that is mostly illiterate, knowledge of the law, and,
importantly, the power to litigate if push comes to shove-causes many Sierra
Leoneans to treat our office with respect.
When the Sierra Leone Farmers' Association was delaying sending
seed-rice to a particular village in Kakua Chiefdom in June, 2004, paralegal
John Macarthy went with village leaders to visit the SLFA official. The
official had been holding out for a bribe. Macarthy told us that the official
trembled as soon as he saw "human rights" on Macarthy's ID card. Rice was
soon delivered.
When a mother of three children complained in Magburaka that the
children's father had abandoned his responsibilities, paralegal Michael Luseni
wrote to invite the father, "Ahmed D.," to our office. Ahmed D. lives in
Lungi. Magburaka is at the center of the country and Lungi is on the western
coast, a two-day journey by public transport. Ahmed D. was a vice-principal
of a school; he found someone to carry a reply letter apologizing that he could
not be present on the suggested day-his principal was out of town and he
was left in charge-and promising that he would visit the office one week
later. He dutifully reported the following week. Our paralegal conducted a
mediation in which father and mother agreed on a specific monthly
maintenance payment to be paid by Ahmed D. to our office and collected by
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the mother there. Why should this man travel two days to answer our letter?
Michael's impression was that Ahmed D. both wanted to take responsibility
for a duty he had shirked and feared the consequences of ignoring us.
Our paralegals are laypeople, and more than half have only a secondary
school education. For most of them, their work with our program is their first
exposure to law. For the designation "paralegal" to have meaning, then, and
for our association with the law not to be empty, we believe it paramount that
the paralegals receive continuous supervision and training from lawyers.
Directors spend more than half of every month between the various offices,
reviewing paralegals' handling of cases, working directly with selected
clients, and providing training on pertinent areas of the law or the workings of
government. On the other hand, formal law and government are only one half
of the resources upon which the program draws (more on legal syncretism,
infra). The paralegals have greater expertise than the directors with regard to
the customary law and institutions in their own localities; they also best
understand the clients' needs and limitations. Paralegals and lawyers discern
the program's synthetic path together; the directors' interactions with the
paralegals must be dialogic rather than didactic in either direction.
In addition to training and supervision by lawyers, a second crucial leg
on which our association with the law stands is litigation. Our litigation
capacity is small; only Simeon Koroma, the Sierra Leonean director, is
qualified to practice in Sierra Leonean courts. We focus our litigation efforts
on cases where the injustice is most severe and on cases which present an
opportunity for legal impact. We have found that litigation is a critical tool in
effectively addressing our clients' problems when other methods fail. And
because litigation or even the threat of litigation carries significant weight in
Sierra Leone-word spreads like wildfire when a lawyer visits the
countryside-our capacity to litigate adds strength to our paralegals' work as
advocates and mediators. Both private citizens and government officials take
our paralegals seriously in part because they know that if push comes to
shove, the organization will push back.
To give a more concrete sense of the importance of litigation, I offer
below a few examples of cases we have litigated or are presently litigating.
These are all cases in which a paralegal alone was unable to obtain redress,
either because of the nature of the harm (we do not support anything short of
criminal prosecution for rape cases, for example), or because of the
unwillingness of the parties involved to respond to paralegal advocacy and/or
negotiation (the owner of the truck in the accident described below ignored
multiple letters from our paralegal). In both types of cases, litigation allows us
to maintain a program whose promotion of rights has teeth. We don't want to
say, "Know your rights! And good luck getting them enforced." Instead, we
want to say "Know your rights! And those who violate rights should listen to
our paralegals when they advocate and negotiate, because if they do not, we
will take them to court." Our ability to stand by the second message is crucial
for the efficacy of the program. We are in the process of raising funds to
increase our litigation capacity. We hope to develop a pool of public interest-
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minded, private lawyers whom we can engage on a case-by-case basis for
costs and small fees.
Examples of litigation include:
" A local (customary) court clerk confiscated money awarded to a
farmer as judgment against another farmer who wrongly cleared
the first farmer's plantation. We are pursuing enforcement of
the judgment and disciplinary action against the clerk. (Kakua
Chiefdom).
" We are suing for health costs on behalf of market women who
were injured when a truck in which they were catching a ride
negligently drove off the road. (Tikonko Chiefdom).
* We successfully secured the release of a man who was detained
for seventy days without being charged. (Makeni).
" We successfully secured the release of a mother of a newborn
who was jailed for spurious reasons at the behest of a "big man"
in her community who was involved in a feud with her family.
(Freetown).
* We have associated with the government in prosecuting the rape
of a seventy-five year-old woman by a thirty-five year-old man.
(Tikonko Chiefdom).
Contrary to what some Sierra Leoneans may believe, however, litigation
is not magic. In addition to being slow and expensive, it is only as good as the
law. One of the definitive characteristics of human rights advocacy is to push
for change and redress in situations where, in any empirical sense, an
enforceable right does not yet exist. Our program is no exception: we also
often advocate beyond any capacity to enforce.
Sometimes people call our bluff. Kadiatu T.'s boyfriend, "Ebong A.,"
was an apprentice to a vendor of used televisions in Lagos who left for
Abidjan in search of better business. When war broke out in Ivory Coast he
hid himself on a merchant ship headed for Spain. The ship's crew caught him
before they reached Freetown and turned him over to the Freetown port
authority. Twelve months later Ebong A. was living in the Clinetown police
station, not under arrest but with nowhere else to go. The policemen allowed
him to sleep there and sometimes shared their rice with him. Somehow, he
found his way to our office in September 2004. He wanted to know: could we
help him get back home.
Paralegal Jow Williams' research revealed that the port authority has a
general procedure for handling stowaways: authorities first register the
stowaways with the police. They then place them, if the ship's captain is
willing, on the next ship to the port from which they came. Somehow Ebong
A. had been forgotten at the police station, and now the port authority officials
did not remember who he was. Williams set up a meeting between a police
officer and the relevant port authority official, in which the police officer
confirmed that Ebong A. was a stowaway from the year before. The port
official acknowledged the mistake and agreed to arrange for Ebong A.'s return
to Nigeria. Perhaps under the spell of Williams' 6lan, the port official also
20061
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:427
agreed to pay a small sum to Ebong A. for feeding and clothing in partial
compensation for the twelve lost months.
Williams wrote up the contents of their oral agreement and sent it to
both the port official and the police officer. The port official must have
thought twice, because he forwarded Williams' letter to his supervisor, who in
turn forwarded the letter to the port authority counsel. We received a letter
two weeks later stating that the port did not have any knowledge of or
obligation to Ebong A.; that if indeed Ebong A. was a stowaway then he was a
criminal; and that the port did sometimes arrange for stowaways to be
returned to their point of embarkation, but that that practice was purely at the
port's discretion.
Jow approached Simeon and me, asking that we sue the port authority.
They failed to follow their own policy, he argued reasonably, and they went
back on their word. But a little research confirmed the port's central claim: the
port authority had no legal obligation to Ebong A. In this case, there was no
legal action with which to back up Jow's advocacy. We explained all this to
Ebong A. Though disappointed and homesick, he said he appreciated Jow's
efforts and that he now considers Jow a mentor. Ebong A. was later grateful
when we were able to assist his girlfriend Kadiatu T. To date, Ebong A. is
living in the Clinetown police station near the port. Jow has hopes of finding
Ebong A. some work, but nothing has panned out yet.
One of our most vulnerable positions regards maintenance payments for
neglected children. If two parents are separated, a parent with custody of
children is entitled to support from the other parent under Sierra Leonean law.
In part because of the massive social dislocations of the war, and in part
because of the evolving culture of male-female relations, single-parent
homes--especially where the children are under the care of the mother-are
quite common in Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, an outdated law sets the
maximum maintenance payment that the courts can enforce at 100 Leones per
week (U.S.D. $0.04).68
In the provinces, we have the advantage that parental responsibility is
also a requirement under customary law, and customary law has no such
monetary limits. Scores of fathers have negotiated maintenance agreements
with the mothers of their children in our offices. They do so in the presence of
elders from their families, who for their part agree to assist with enforcement.
The precise amount of maintenance to be paid is determined by considering
both the children's need and the father's earning capacity.
Our paralegals have developed creative ways of making the agreements
viable. One farmer in Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, "Yusuf J.," agreed that
15,000 Leones (U.S.D. $5.66) per month was a reasonable amount for the
mother of his children to ask for, but insisted that he would be incapable of
keeping up with the payments every month. A farmer's earnings, he
explained, are seasonal: after the harvest he could probably pay 30,000
Leones (U.S.D. $11.32), but after planting 15,000 Leones would be
impossible. Gbonkolenken paralegals proposed that Yusuf J. pay a minimum
68. The Bastardy Laws Increase of Payment Act #2 (1988).
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of 5,000 Leones (U.S.D. $1.89) every month and then ensure that within every
six months, on his own schedule, a total of 90,000 Leones (U.S.D. $33.96)
was paid. Both parties and their families were pleased with this proposal, and
Yusuf J. has complied with the agreement to date. Our paralegals began to use
similar arrangements with other farmers as well.
In Freetown, a master's degree student, "Tommy F.," reported to our
office when invited, acknowledged responsibility for the child of the woman
who had approached us, participated in mediation, and agreed to a scheme of
monthly payments. A month later, however, he refused to comply with the
agreement. When the Freetown paralegals paid him a visit, he said, with
temerity, "I am not paying anything; go ahead and sue me if you want."
Perhaps he had spoken to a lawyer. Magistrates do occasionally depart from
the ordinance limits to award more reasonable maintenance agreements, but
one cannot count on it. We might also sue for breach of contract. Our
mediation agreements contain the following clause: "That both parties, having
freely consented to the above conditions and obligations and the Organization
serving as guarantor as such, any breach of the said conditions and obligations
will be considered absolutely unacceptable AND the aggrieved party with the
support of the Organization MAY consider legal action.
6
If we do sue, it is possible that Tommy F. has the resources to hire a
lawyer. Simeon is concerned that a lawyer on the other side might challenge
the validity of our mediation process on the grounds that we failed to inform
the parties beforehand of the legal limits on court-enforced maintenance
agreements, arguably a pertinent legal fact. This is not an unbeatable
argument-one might challenge the validity of the ordinance itself, citing
magistrate decisions which have departed from it-but Simeon is cautious
about doing damage to our young program's reputation before the court and
the bar. We also plan to advocate that parliament update the law on child
support, but there has been no change yet, and legislative action in Sierra
Leone tends to be snail-paced. At this writing we are still researching our
course of action in this case.
The color of law gives us power. We have a duty not to abuse it. We
aspire to a fine balance between progressive advocacy, pushing on the
boundaries of just expectations, and pragmatic enforcement, maintaining the
capacity to back our arguments with action. v
3. Modified Professionalism
Our program strives to serve clients and communities with some of the
rigor and professionalism of the practice of law. The paralegals follow a
standardized system for maintaining case files, for tracking and following up
69. Timap for Justice, Model Mediation Agreement (2004) (unpublished, on file with Timap
for Justice).
70. Dan Kahan argues that law makers need to engage in an analogous balancing act in order
to ensure that laws aiming to change norms are not met with backlashes of non-enforcement. See Dan
M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges Versus Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
607 (2000).
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cases, and for recording their own efforts. Paralegals are bound to uphold
client confidentiality, and we consider our files to be privileged.71 Directors
can trace a paper record in any case, and paralegals and directors frequently
go over cases to think critically about the choices made and strategies taken.
Our level of organization and professionalism sets our work apart from some
of the other human rights groups operating in the country, and our clients
appreciate that we take them so seriously.
The word "client" itself we borrow from the lawyer's lexicon. That word
reminds us of the professional duty we have to the people we serve. But in
fact the word client-and the heuristic of legal service in general-is only
partially accurate shorthand. One way in which the term is imperfect is that
we engage the people we work with not only as people in need of a service but
also as social agents; I will focus on the issue of agency in the next sub-
section. Another way in which "client" misses the mark is that we do not hold
the client's interest as highly as a lawyer would. The adversarialism of the
common law system-the theory that a neutral decision-maker is more likely
to arrive at a balanced view if each side has a zealous advocate than if all sides
attempt a degree of neutrality-rests on the presumption of equality of arms.
It makes sense where both sides have reasonably comparable representation.
72
As I have tried to explain, much of justice in Sierra Leone works in exactly
the opposite way: victory to the biggest arm. In addition, we are the only
provider of paralegal services in the places where we work. In a dispute
between two parties within the community, it would be arbitrary of us to favor
the party who happens to approach our office first.
Rather than the particular persons who file complaints, then, we
conceive of our ultimate duty as being toward the entire community and
toward basic principles of justice and democratic equality. This is a tall order,
and we rely on our community oversight boards to help us stay on course.
Wherever possible, we aim, as customary law aims, for mutually acceptable
reconciliation. Hence mediation is one of our most frequently-used tools.
Sometimes our commitment to principles of justice requires us to part
from both customary law and the express interests of parties to a dispute. We
do not accept, for example, a mediation agreement between husband and wife
that would require a husband to beat his wife sparingly, or "only when
justified." Despite the fact that wife-beating is acceptable under customary
law, we take a hard line on domestic violence. We also refuse to mediate rape
cases, though this is the traditional approach to rape. In both these instances
we cite formal law, but in fact we would hold these stances regardless of what
the formal law stated.
Where, then, does our moral compass come from? We have yet to make
it explicit either in content or origins. Its sources are undoubtedly mixed:
Christianity and Islam, traditional Sierra Leonean values modified by the
71. We claim attorney-client privilege for our case files, though this has not yet been tested in
court.
72. See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTTCE 3-9 (2004).
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claims of the international human rights movement. For now we work from
case to case rather than articulating a moral theory.
4. Agency and Community-Level Action
Writing about her experience working with undocumented immigrant
workers on Long Island, New York, Jennifer Gordon grapples with the
tensions between law and organizing:
If rights talk can support people as they dream-and act-beyond the limits of current
law, it makes sense to talk about rights as a part of an organizing effort. But what about
rights enforcement, traditionally understood as the plodding process of pursuing a case
through the courts or a government agency? Such legal claims tend to be deeply
individual, dependent on a lawyer as an intermediary, tightly scripted in terms of how the
"client" can behave and what she can demand, and limited in outcome to the law's
definition of justice. Much of this is antithetical to organizing's belief in self-reliance and
collective action. It would seem that offering members legal representation to enforce
individual rights would have little positive role to play in organizing.
73
In Sierra Leone we did not begin with a focus on community organizing,
as those in pursuit of justice in other contexts sometimes do. Sierra Leone is,
in fact, a heavily organized place. In virtually every chiefdom and every
village one finds a women's group, a youth association, multiple farmers'
associations, the traditional societies of poro and sande (sometimes called
"secret societies"), a footballers' association, a petty traders' group, a
marketwomen's group, a community development association, and others.
Sierra Leone is in organizational surplus rather than shortage.
Also, the war bequeathed to Sierra Leoneans a skepticism of
organizations that hold grand social and political ambitions and that have
connections to the outside world. The RUF was just such a group: they talked
of freedom, of justice for the poor, of social transformation, and they were
associated with social movements in other places, like the student protest
movement in Freetown in the late 1970s and Qadhafi's "Green Book" pan-
Africanism. 74 The RUF's way of advancing social transformation was to loot,
rape, and kill civilians and to raze their homes and villages. Many Sierra
Leoneans have had enough with that kind of thing.
Our initial focus was on the thing that still seems most necessary: to
show through concrete examples-not words or dreams-that justice is
possible. But we are not satisfied to think of community members as clients
with needs who require a service. We also do not wish to create in the
institution of the paralegal another layer of privileged and relatively powerful
big persons on whom ordinary people depend. We aim for our work to live up
73. JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 185
(2005) (explaining the way that, despite these concerns, the Workplace Project, which Gordon founded
in 1992, is able to use a legal clinic to support its primary aim of worker organizing). See also Peter
Evans, Collective Capabilities, Culture, and Amartya Sen's Development as Freedom, 37 STUD. IN
COMP. INT'L DEV. 54, 56 (2002) (arguing that "for the less privileged attaining [Amartya Sen's
conception of] development as freedom requires collective action").
74. MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI, THE GREEN BOOK (1976).
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to the notion of "legal empowerment," to contribute to the social agency of
poor Sierra Leoneans.
Empowerment is a compelling but elusive concept, and difficult to
measure. 5 Are Pa Lansana, Kadiatu T., and Macie B. somehow more capable
as social agents as a result of our interventions? 76 We believe that our
paralegals are better suited to contribute to empowerment than, for example,
conventional legal aid lawyers, because they are closer to the communities in
which they work and because of their use of empowerment-oriented tools like
education. We aspire to solve justice problems in collaboration with our
clients rather than on behalf of them.
77
From the beginning we have defined the paralegal' s role in terms of both
assisting individual clients and addressing community-level problems. The
latter of these roles is crucial for our attempt to cultivate agency. Some of our
efforts at the community level have involved supporting communities in their
pursuit of economic and social-structural development. Residents in
Kutumhan Section of Bumpeh Chiefdom, for example, came together in early
2005 under the leadership of the section chief to repair roads in the section
collectively. The young men doing the bulk of the work later objected to the
schedule set by the section chief for two reasons: first, they lacked adequate
tools, and second, the road work was preventing them from properly preparing
their farms for the rains. Paralegal Joseph Sawyer mediated between the
youths and the chief to arrive at a new timetable which would not interfere
with farm work. Sawyer also helped the section apply to a local NGO,
Network Movement for Justice and Development, for a grant of tools which
allowed them to move forward with the road repairs more efficiently.
In other instances paralegals have worked to improve the democracy and
effectiveness of existing community organizations. The Gbonkolenken Youths
Council is the umbrella organization for youth in Gbonkolenken Chiefdom;
the council runs development, social, and athletic activities and represents the
voice of the youth to chiefdom elders and authorities. "Youth" is a broad
category in Sierra Leone, generally encompassing people under the age of
forty. Anthropologists have characterized this society as gerontocratic, and
many observers believe that subjugation of youth by elders was among the
causes of the civil war. Youth institutions play an important social and
political role in the country.
In October 2004, the Gbonkolenken Youth Council was near collapse.
Its members had accused its leadership of corruption and incompetence. The
general membership body asked paralegal Daniel Sesay to assist in an
75. See, e.g., CHRisTOPHER GIBSON & MICHAEL WOOLCOCK, EMPOWERMENT AND LOCAL
LEvEL CONFLICT MEDIATION IN INDONESIA: A COMPARATIvE ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS, MEASURES, AND
PROJECT EFFICACY (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3713, 2005) (reporting on
attempts to measure the empowerment effects of conflict mediation work in Indonesia).
76. We hope to engage in more systematic research, along similar lines to that of Gibson and
Woolcock, id., on the empowerment effects of our own work.
77. The proponents of problem-solving legal services also often embrace a collaborative
orientation toward their clients. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 53, at 59, 67-74; Seielstad, supra note 53, at
448-52.
78. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, REBUILDING FAILED STATES 13-14 (2004).
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investigation and assessment of the Council. Daniel helped to recover three
million Leones (U.S.D. $1132.08) of the Council's property and to undertake
an audit of the Council's finances. Daniel organized a public "truth" hearing
in which he persuaded various members of the Youth Council to admit their
transgressions and to commit to plans for remediation. He prepared a report of
his findings and recommendations and presented them to the council's
membership. He now has been asked to assist in developing a new
constitution and structure for the council.
Community-level work undertaken with the amputees of Bumpeh-Gao
Chiefdom intertwined the pursuit of relief from external institutions with the
process of internal community development. The RUF practice of cutting off
the hands and arms of civilians exemplified the extraordinary brutality of
Sierra Leone's civil war. In Bumpeh-Gao Chiefdom, two NGOs, Norwegian
Refugee Council and Cause Canada, attempted to provide assistance to
amputees after the war ended. The NGOs set out to build a complex of houses
for the amputees and their families. They also promised water wells; monthly
stipends for double-amputees; some clothing and toiletry items; vocational
training in tailoring, fabric dying, and soap making; and start-up equipment
and capital to engage in these cottage industries. The homes were built and the
training was provided but the other promises didn't materialize. It turned out
that the NGOs had sub-contracted to a few local men who had absconded with
the money. Both the paramount chief and the Chiefdom Council had
approached the NGOs, but the NGOs refused to act themselves and pointed
instead to the sub-contractors who were now at large.
The issue was brought to our office some eight months later. With the
help of Allison Kent, a legal intern from the United States, our paralegals
wrote letters to both NGOs asking for an explanation as to why the items
promised were never delivered. These letters were followed up by further
meetings and, eventually, Norwegian Refugee Council acknowledged that
they had some items which were meant for the Bumpeh amputees, but that
they had lost touch with the camp, they were in the process of withdrawing
from the country, and they had no way of transporting the goods to Bumpeh.
We used our jeep to bring a sewing machine, toiletry supplies, and used
clothing, all from Norwegian Refugee Council, to the amputees. Norwegian
Refugee Council also gave us the names of the people contracted to build the
water wells. Our paralegals tracked these people down and threatened that our
organization would take legal action against them; within a month the wells
were built in the amputee camp.
Cause Canada refused to respond to us at first, until we raised the
possibilities of contacting their headquarter office in Canada and taking legal
action within Sierra Leone. After several letters and meetings, Cause Canada
found and pressured their sub-contractor, who in turn finally came to Bumpeh
and supplied the start-up kits to the amputees in the presence of the paralegals
and the paramount chief.
Paralegal Joseph Sawyer and legal intern Allison Kent then helped the
amputees to set up a cooperative to begin producing and selling gara (a Sierra
Leonean style of tie-dyed fabric) using the equipment in the start-up kits.
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Allison donated some additional funds to get the cooperative started. Joseph
continues to serve as a board member and advisor of the cooperative, which is
in the process of selling its first batch of clothes. Cracking this longstanding
case of corruption gave the residents of the amputee camp reason to believe
that they could influence their own fates, and led to the formation of an
institution for that purpose. There has been a palpable shift in the spirit of the
amputees in Bumpeh-Gao from resignation toward determination.
Community-level actions also allow us to address some of the root
causes of the problems that we handle. In June 2004 the principal of a
secondary school in Magburaka, the Boys School, locked a student in his
office, beat him with electrical cables, and kicked and punched him. Our
paralegal Michael Luseni helped the student to obtain medical care and to
approach the police. The principal has a record of abuse, but the police were
unwilling to prosecute because of the principal's status as a big man in the
community. Director Simeon Koroma declared that our organization would
pursue private criminal prosecution (permissible in Sierra Leone) against the
principal. Just that statement-we had not yet filed papers--created an uproar.
The principal led all the teachers in a rally to the courthouse, and people all
over town, as well as the radio and print press, discussed the fact that the
human rights people might go after the Boys School principal. We ended up
abandoning litigation after a series of events which I will not detail here.
The boy who had been beaten was enrolled into a good school in
Makeni, the provincial capital in the North, and the principal now allows our
paralegals in Magburaka to monitor the school regularly. The Magburaka
paralegals are preparing a workshop which will take place in the school on the
rights of the child and student-teacher relations. Their hope is that this
dialogue, and their regular contact with the school, will help to alleviate the
common problem of corporal punishment.
5. Engaging Legal Dualism
Our approach to the dualist legal structure is pragmatic: we draw on both
sets of institutions in any given case, depending largely on which institutional
course will best achieve our client's interests and the interests of justice. Our
efforts can be divided into two broad categories: first, there are those cases in
which our paralegals forge connections between formal law and government
on the one hand and rural and/or marginalized communities on the other hand;
second, there are other cases which involve internal justice development
within the customary setting.
Poor communities often experience formal law and government as
strange, absent, and/or abusive. Because of their training and their connection
to law, paralegals can help poor and marginal communities to access the
formal system and to make it work for them. Bridges across the dualist divide
take three different forms. First, we sometimes invoke the formal legal system
to check unfairness and exploitation within the customary system. Pa
Lansana's story is a case in point; there we drew on a formal legal institution,
the customary law officer, to check Pa Roke's abuse of customary legal
process and the chieftaincy. It is not that Sierra Leone's formal legal system
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embodies in practice the norm we hoped to enforce in this case-due process
of law and an independent judiciary. To the contrary, the formal courts
systematically fail to abide by either idea. But the formal system's theoretical
commitment to these principles has led to enforcement institutions (in this
case, the Customary Law Officer within the Law Officers' Department) which
we can engage. Although on Mamdani's account of African history these
same principles may have once had more traction within customary law, in
Kholifa Rowalla in the present day there is very limited recourse within the
chiefdom structure if the paramount chief decides to interfere in your case.
Another example of this formal-trumps-customary kind of intervention is our
actions on domestic violence. Despite the fact that wife-beating is acceptable
in principle under customary law, we will assist women to broker agreements
and, if the women choose, pursue police prosecution, to combat domestic
violence.
A second kind of connection involves assisting community members in
engaging the formal system to respond to abuse that emanates from some
other organ of the formal system. For example, we are assisting a group of
workers from a school in Magburaka, through advocacy with the Education
Ministry, to recover two years worth of back wages which were stolen
somewhere along the chain of government disbursement. Another example is
the case of Kadiatu T., in which we threatened to use litigation-a formal
legal tool-in response to abuse by a formal government police officer. Rather
than a conflict between formal and customary norms, the problem here is in
forcing the formal system to follow its own rules. The relevant dualism in
these cases is not so much the division between formal and customary but
rather the related, broader division between law and society. Kadiatu T. lives
in Freetown, the geographic heart of the formal legal system, but her poverty
and her place in society make the formal institutions that would check the
formal system's abuses practically unavailable to her.
A third kind of connection does not involve responding to a particular
abuse but rather allowing poor people to access or participate in formal
structures. Paralegals facilitate this access and/or participation when, for
example, they bring the Education Ministry's attention to the need for school
renovations in a rural community, or assist a farmers' cooperative to apply for
support from the Ministry of Agriculture.
For all our engagement with the formal system, however, we are not
legal missionaries who would banish customary darkness with formal legal
light. Customary institutions deserve respect both for their link to tradition and
for the fact that they, far more than the formal institutions, are accessible and
relevant to most Sierra Leoneans. So a second reform orientation involves
improving the customary system from within. Our work in this regard departs
from the exclusive focus of most law reform efforts on the formal system, and
resonates instead with what Madhavi Sunder calls "New Enlightenment"
2006]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31: 427
efforts to advance freedom from within cultures which traditionally have been
viewed as outside the modern public sphere.79
Examples of these efforts include improving the democratic character of
community organizations (as Daniel Sesay did with the Gbonkolenken Youth
Association), advocating with chiefs and customary officials for progressive
evolution of customary law, and Macie B.'s case, in which paralegals
employed a traditional practice (an exorcism) in a creative way to deal with
injustice caused by a traditional belief (abandonment due to accusation of
witchcraft).
In January 2006, a mother from Magburaka came to our office to
complain that her four-year-old daughter had been seized and brought,
without her permission, to the bondu (female secret society) bush for the
purpose of initiation, including genital circumcision. The circumcision, she
had learned, had already taken place. The mother wanted her child to be
returned safely and wanted to be exempt from the payment which the secret
society usually collects from all families whose daughters are initiated.
Because of the strong taboo against "outside" meddling in this tradition-non-
members of the societies are barred from even mentioning or discussing
them--our paralegals determined that formal channels such as the police
would be useless in this case.
Instead, they decided to approach the paramount chief. The chief was no
opponent of female genital mutilation-he had subsidized, as is common
practice, the initiations of hundreds of girls during the present season. But it is
a violation of customary law to initiate a pre-adolescent girl or boy without
the consent of the child's family. The chief informed the paralegals that the
society heads had acted without his authorization and declared a 100,000
Leone (U.S.D. $37.75) fine against them for this breach.
This allowed the paralegals to approach the society heads themselves.
The bondu leaders were offended that two men--one of whom was not even a
member of the male society, and both of whom were acting in their official
capacity as "human rights workers"-would dare to even broach this subject
with them. They refused outright the paralegals' suggestion that they sign an
agreement assuring the safe return of the young girl. To sign a paper, they felt,
would be to acknowledge an unacceptable intrusion. But because of the
chief's declaration of non-support, the society leaders cooperated. They
promised that the girl would be returned safely, and they agreed not to
demand a fee from the girl's mother. Later, they paid the fine to the chief for
their breach of customary law.
Here our paralegals invoked a customary institution-the paramount
chieftancy-to enforce a customary norm-the ban on initiations of young
girls without parental permission-for the purpose of mitigating and deterring
the recurrence of an already-committed injustice. I agree with our paralegals
that invoking the formal system in this case would have been counter-
79. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE LJ. 1399 (2003). Sunder finds such
internal dissent in the work of grassroots women's rights activists in the Muslim world.
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productive: a "hard shove," in Dan Kahan's terms, rather than a "gentle
nudge."8
Though urban and educated girls increasingly opt out of women's
society membership, formal government is unlikely to intervene in the
practice of female genital circumcision in Sierra Leone. The wife of President
Tejan-Kabbah sponsored the initiations, including circumcision, of 1,500 girls
to attract votes in the 2002 elections, and the present Minister of Social
Welfare once promised to "sew up the mouths" of those who questioned the
practice. " Even if some elites changed their minds, the practice, and the
cultural wall of secrecy that surrounds it, are too deeply entrenched to be
susceptible to outside regulation in the near term.82
If broad change does come, it will no doubt bear the influences of the
outside world, including modem notions of health and personal autonomy.
Our program might be one vector of influence, along with music and
television and the cross-migration of people. But the only kind of reform that
is plausible in the medium term is one that involves an evolution of norms
and, perhaps, a renegotiation of power relations within the communities in
which the practice occurs. As a result of the case narrated above and another
case in which six girls fled their village to our office to avoid forced
circumcision, we are beginning an attempt to engage the issue of female
genital circumcision at a community level. We are trying to identify local
female bondu members who are critical of, or at least ambivalent about, the
practice. At this stage, given the taboos against discussion by non-members, it
is only through such women that an internal dialogue on the health
consequences of circumcision and its implications for girls' personal freedom
could begin.
Our hope is that our piecemeal, grassroots efforts on both sides of the
formal/customary and law/society divides will contribute to a reform of Sierra
Leone's dualist legal structure that is synthetic, drawing out the strengths of
both systems rather than exalting one to vanquish the other, and that takes its
direction from the experiences of ordinary Sierra Leoneans.
F. Model of Social Change Distilled
These five themes--our creative mix of methods, our use of litigation
and the color of law, our modified professionalism, our commitment to
agency and community action, and our synthetic approach to legal dualism-
80. Kahan, supra note 70, at 608 (arguing that "norms stick when lawmakers try to change
them with 'hard shoves' but yield when lawmakers apply 'gentle nudges"').
81. Female Circumcision Is a Vote Winner, IRINnews.org (U.N. Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs) (Mar. 17, 2005), available at http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?
ReportlD=46151.
82. Countries which have passed legislative prohibitions against female genital mutilation
have often failed to enforce those laws. See, e.g., Equality Now, Tanzania: Failing to Enforce the Law
Against Female Genital Mutilation, Women's Action 20.1 (June 2001), http://equalitynow.orgt
english/actions/action_2001_en.html ("Female genital mutilation ... is prohibited by law in Tanzania.
The law is not effectively enforced, however, and the practice of FGM continues openly. In some parts
of Tanzania, mass circumcisions are carried out in which thousands of girls are genitally cut at the same
time, generally in December.").
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are all aspects of a model of social change. Employing this model, our
program consistently achieves improbable results, results which clients and
community members often tell us they would have previously considered to
be impossible.
In summary, this model consists of:
1. Dogged, sophisticated, sensitive (to culture and community)
advocacy. This ongoing advocacy takes place within individual
mediations, with powerful people like police officers and chiefs,
in community education efforts, etc.
2. The confluence of a) knowledge of and facility with formal law
and government, and b) knowledge of the community and
facility with more community-oriented, social movement-type
tools. Few social agents in Sierra Leone possess both kinds of
knowledge and tools.
3. Crucial among formal legal tools is the background threat of,
and the sparing but strategic use of, litigation and high-level
advocacy. These are often the teeth behind the paralegals'
ongoing advocacy on the ground.
4. Paralegals bridge law and society. In poor communities, formal
law and government are often experienced as strange, absent,
and/or abusive. Paralegals help marginal communities to access
the formal system and to make it work for them-by engaging
the customary law officer in Pa Lansana's case, for example, or
by drawing the education ministry's and local council's
attention to the need for school renovations in the community.
5. In addition to building bridges between marginal communities
and the formal system, paralegals also engage in internal justice
development within the community. Examples of these efforts
include helping community organizations to become more
democratic and advocating with chiefs and customary officials
for progressive evolution of customary law.
G. Sustainability
The continuation of our work depends on our capacity to raise resources.
We presently pay paralegals approximately U.S.D. $200 per month. Other
costs include the directors' salaries and expenses, fuel and maintenance for the
project vehicle, rent for office spaces, and transportation allowances for the
paralegals. We are in the process of doubling our scope to ten chiefdoms; it
will cost us approximately U.S.D. $180,000 per year to run the program at this
scale.
Many argue that the provision of basic legal services to the poor is a
governmental obligation. Given the resource circumstances in Sierra Leone,
government funding would be a long-term hope at best. Also, an important
dimension of our work is to challenge government and hold it accountable.
Even if it were available, then, government funding might pose a threat to our
program's independence.
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Major donors, such as the aid agencies of G8 countries and multilateral
institutions like United Nations Development Programme and the World
Bank, might be more realistic sources of medium- and long-term support. The
communities with whom we work and other concerned Sierra Leoneans may
also contribute to program costs. Ideally, and depending of course on the
availability of resources, we would like to see paralegal services extended to
most or all of the country. Expansion would not necessarily need to take place
under our administrative structure but could be undertaken by other affiliated
organizations, especially those with regional expertise. We are trying to
maintain a sufficiently low per-chiefdom cost to make the argument for wide-
scale expansion realistic.
Our work in Sierra Leone is an experiment in progress, and it has just
begun. We have tried to respond to Sierra Leone's unique context with a
creative and multi-faceted approach to justice problems. Our experience in the
last two years leads us to believe we are on to something, and we hope to find
the resources, strength, and humility to continue.
III. PARALEGALS IN GLOBAL VIEW
Paralegal programs of different stripes exist in Africa, South and East
Asia, Latin America, Europe, and North America. Despite the mass and
diversity of these existing efforts, paralegalism (to borrow the term used by
the National Association of Community Based Paralegals in South Africa) has
received scant attention from legal scholars and major institutions involved in
human rights and development.
There is far too much paralegal work in the world to comprehensively
characterize in this Essay. My aim here is to give a broad sense of the global
paralegal landscape and to offer insights about the paralegal approach which
emerge from international experience. This discussion is divided into five
parts: First, I consider the range of functions paralegals perform. Second, I
draw on this variety of efforts as well as on our experiments in Sierra Leone to
describe what I believe to be the essence of the paralegal approach. Third, I
elaborate the ways in which this approach complements the conventional
method of providing justice services, namely, formal legal aid. Fourth, I
address three issues involving the way paralegal efforts are structured:
training, payment, and relationship to the government. Finally, I argue for the
international human rights and development communities to play a greater
role in supporting paralegal work.
83. A Lexis-Nexis search for "paralegal," for example, turns up only references to paralegals
as lawyers' assistants in the United States, and no articles on justice services for the poor.
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A. Diversity of Paralegal Efforts
1. Generalist Community-Based Paralegals
The generalist community-based paralegal model, which is the closest
antecedent for our work in Sierra Leone, is only one of many ways of defining
the work that paralegals undertake. Especially in Africa, those paralegals
labeled "community-based" are associated both with being situated in the
communities that they serve and with being generalists. The substantive
direction of their work is determined by whatever problems community
members bring to them. Paralegals often combine assistance to individual
clients with other methods like community education and advocacy. The
generalist community-based model is particularly prominent in southern
Africa. In South Africa, organizations like Black Sash began establishing
"advice centers" during the 1960s, which helped non-white South Africans to
navigate and defend themselves against the byzantine codes of the apartheid
regime. Since 1994, South African paralegals have focused on areas such as
pension benefits, the rights of people livinA with AIDS, employment issues,
gender-based violence, and land restitution.
Black Sash's professional paralegals staff offices in cities and towns;
they also help train volunteer paralegals, who turn to the professionals for
advice and assistance where necessary. Black Sash's work also extends to
policy advocacy. Where it identifies negative trends in government behavior
or policies, it mobilizes to seek changes, sometimes in combination with
lawyers' NGOs engaged in litigation.
Community-based paralegals in Zimbabwe in recent years have been
working in conditions of civil and political repression that bear some
similarities to the apartheid era in South Africa. The Legal Resources
Foundation, which employs community-based paralegals across the country,
reported in 2002 that several advice offices were forced to shut down, others
forced to change location, and that "hostile attitudes of so-called war veterans
and ZANU-PF activists have created an intimidatory environment for the
community wishing to seek the services of the paralegals." 85 Legal Resources
Foundation reported that paralegals' cases focused on deceased estates,
maintenance, property recovery, and debt collection, "with people looking for
ways in which to raise money to survive." 86 Paralegals also handled a
significant number of birth registration cases because the Mugabe regime
made birth certificates a prerequisite for the identity documents needed to
vote.
87
The Law and Human Rights Center (LHRC), which works with what the
Indian government classifies as the "tribal" population in south Gujarat, India,
84. Interview with Martin Monyela, Director, National Community Based Paralegals
Association, in Johannesburg, South Africa (Apr. 21, 2004).
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is another example of a community-based paralegal effort. LHRC paralegals
combine legal advice (including connecting clients with LHRC lawyers in
severe cases), mediation, and community organizing. LHRC places strong
emphasis on the last of these: LHRC's team of some 300 paralegals helped to
establish "sangathan," or "people's organizations," in more than 300 villages
in Surat District between 1998 and 2001. The sangathans define their
priorities collectively and take on community-level issues such as opposing
harmful industrialization or organizing community savings and loan
programs. 88 There are myriad other examples of generalist community-based
paralegal programs, from Citizens Advice Bureaus in the United Kingdom to
the Human Rights Defenders Network in Chiapas, Mexico.
2. Specialization
Many other paralegal programs specialize their efforts in one way or
another. Paralegals from the Filipino farmers' organization Kasama are just as
community-based as their counterparts in southern Africa or India, but they
focus their work on two specific issues: "conversion of the members' plots of
land from share tenancy to leasehold status; and assisting members in getting
their legal share of crop proceeds." 89 Both these tasks require relatively
sophisticated legal knowledge and paralegal skills, including representing
farmer applicants before Department of Agrarian Reform tribunals hearing
their land reform applications. (In the Philippines, paralegals are legally
entitled to represent fellow citizens in administrative tribunals and processes
pertaining to labor and agrarian reform.) Stephen Golub, one of the few
scholars who have thought analytically about the use of paralegals as a
strategy for advancing justice, finds that the Kasama paralegals' specialization
in such cases allows them to maximize efficacy in the two areas of most
importance to organization members.
90
Other programs specialize in a particular methodology. In Bangladesh,
for example, the Madaripur Legal Aid Association focuses on alternative
dispute resolution. Beginning in the late 1970s, MLAA invoked a traditional
Bengali approach to conflict, called "shalish," in which village-level
mediation is conducted by voluntary committees, and adjusted that tradition
according to principles of fairness, equality, and certain aspects of national
law. MLAA ensured that the mediation committees included women, for
example. MLAA also trained "mediation workers"-the equivalent of
paralegals-who are responsible for receiving applications for mediation,
coordinating mediation sessions, and following up and monitoring
settlements. 91
88. Pritha Sen, People's Organizations: A New Beginning for India's Tribals,
CHANGEMAKERS, Nov. 2001, available at http://changemakers.net/journal/Olnovember/sen.cfm.
89. Stephen Golub & Kim McQuay, Legal Empowerment: Advancing Good Governance and
Poverty Reduction, in LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK § 255 (Asian
Development Bank 2001), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/LawADB/Ipr..2001.pdf.
90. Id.
91. PENAL REFORM INT'L, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: COMMUNITY-BASED
MEDIATION AS AN AUXILIARY TO FORMAL JUSTICE IN BANGLADESH 6-7 (2003).
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The mediation workers are connected to legal aid lawyers. They are
trained to refer egregious, criminal cases for formal legal action rather than to
promote mediation in such instances. 92 This defined, circumscribed model
may be easier to bring to scale than the more flexible and locality-specific
community-based paralegal approach. By 2003, MLAA was working with
450 mediation committees, and the organization estimated that its committees
had resolved 50,000 disputes over a 25-year period.93 Another reason why
paralegal specialization may be aVropriate in Bangladesh is the country's
exceptionally robust civil society. When other organizations are likely to
provide complementary services in the same localities, it makes sense to focus
on a particular, well-defined need.
The Paralegal Advisory Service (PAS) in Malawi specializes in a single
issue, the rights of prisoners and detainees, as well as a specific set of
methods. Paralegals in the PAS are recognized by the Malawi justice system,
and their duties are twofold. First, they conduct regular clinics in the prisons,
targeted especially for pre-trial detainees. These clinics aim to explain the
process of criminal prosecution, from arrest and detention through summary
trial to committal proceedings and trial in high court. The clinics include
participatory dramatizations of bail applications, cross examinations, and
pleas for mitigation in sentencing in order to familiarize prisoners with those
processes.95
Second, the paralegals provide basic assistance to individual detainees
and prisoners. For pre-trial detainees, the paralegals largely handle claims for
dismissal and bail. The judiciary, police, and PAS have agreed on a standard
form for bail applications which the paralegals are authorized to assist
detainees in filling out. Paralegals also help detainees to track down relatives
in the community who can serve as sureties. Paralegals meet directly with
police prosecutors to review cases, and often succeed in facilitating detainees'
release on bail or, in some instances, dismissal for want of prosecution. For
convicted prisoners, paralegals assist with appeals of sentences, again using a
standard form agreed upon with the judiciary. Between May 2000 and March
2003, PAS estimated that paralegals had facilitated the release of over 1,000
prisoners (including those released on bail). 96
B. Essence of the Paralegal Approach
What do these disparate kinds of work have in common? There is no
clear definition of the paralegal approach in the legal literature. Drawing on
92. Stephen Golub, Nonlawyers as Legal Resources for Their Communities, in MANY ROADS
TO JUSTICE 297, 306 (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds., 2000), available at
http://www.fordfound.org/publications/recent-articles/manyroads.cfm.
93. PENAL REFORM INT'L, supra note 91, at 6-7.
94. Bangladesh is a hotbed of NGO activity, though the quality of that activity varies greatly.
It is said that if one adds the number of villages Grameen Bank is working in with the number of
villages Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is working in, the number is greater than
the total number of villages in Bangladesh.
95. PARALEGAL ADVISORY SERVICE, ENERGISING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN MALAWI
8 (2002).
96. Id. at i1.
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both international experience and our experiments in Sierra Leone, I would
argue for defining the essence of the paralegal approach in the following way:
1. Paralegals are laypeople working directly with the poor or
otherwise disadvantaged to address issues of justice and human
rights. 7 Paralegals have two kinds of training: 1) substantive-in
formal law and the functioning of government; and 2) skills-in
mediation, investigation, negotiation, advocacy, organizing,
community education. Paralegal methods consist of a mixture of
these skills. The precise blend of methods varies according to the
needs of a given case and the focus of a given program.
2. Paralegals strive to achieve concrete solutions to people's justice
problems, like retrieving arbitrarily denied pension benefits for a
mineworker in South Africa, or obtaining a release on bail for a
criminal defendant in Malawi. Community education is always a
critical component of a paralegal's work, but if it stands alone it
can come across as empty talk.98
3. Paralegals make use of the law. In some cases, the law is at the
center of the paralegal's mission, as with paralegals from farmer
organizations in the Philippines, who aim to bridge the gap
between law and enforcement, to turn the words and vision of
agrarian reform legislation into lived facts for Filipino farmers. In
other cases, as with mediation workers in Bangladesh, paralegals
fill the holes that inadequate formal legal structures leave. Even
there, formal law is an important presence at the margins:
mediation workers must know when the harm involved is so
egregious that it is necessary to pull the trigger of formal
prosecution.
4. Paralegals are connected to lawyers and litigation. All of the
paralegals mentioned here interact with lawyers in some way.
Many paralegals in South Africa work without direct supervision
by lawyers, but most South African paralegals have some
connection to organizations engaged in public interest litigation. In
fact, some of South Africa's most important impact litigation cases
have originated from paralegal advice offices. 9 Part of a
paralegal's job is to discern when legal action might be effective
and appropriate.
97. Depending on how broadly one defines human rights, these are largely overlapping
categories. Some justice issues, like land reform in the Philippines or democratization of a youth
association in Sierra Leone, may not involve a well-defined right under international human rights law.
98. See, e.g., ANDREA WOODHOUSE, WoRLD BANK, VILLAGE JUSTICE IN INDONESIA: CASE
STUDIES ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VILLAGE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE 68 (2004) ("The existing
literature suggests that interventions focusing on education and training are likely to fail unless linked to
cases that appeal to villagers' self-interest .... Legal empowerment efforts should therefore target
concrete cases and use them as opportunities for integrated activities: providing legal assistance,
mobilizing socially and fostering links to civil society institutions to monitor the legal system.").
99. Interview with Rudolph Jansen, Director, Lawyers for Human Rights, in Pretoria, South
Africa (Apr. 21, 2004).
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C. An Important Complement to Formal Legal Aid
Paralegals are much less costly than lawyers. It is possible to train a
large and widely-spread cadre of paralegals, while in some places the supply
of lawyers is restrictively small and concentrated. We would underestimate
the power of paralegalism, however, if we were to conceive of paralegals only
as good substitutes in the event that lawyers are not available.
In addition to the advantages of cost effectiveness and availability, the
paralegal approach complements formal legal aid in several important ways.
1. Paralegals are often closer to the communities they serve. They
tend to be 'of' those communities while lawyers are frequently
outsiders and elites.
2. Paralegals have a wider and more flexible set of tools, including
community education, mediation, and community organizing.
What group of lawyers has established hundreds of people's
institutions as the LHRC paralegals have in Gujarat? Lawyers
would not know what to do about many of the problems which
paralegals address. Unlike many lawyer-centered legal aid
programs, paralegals need not assume that formalistic legal
solutions are the correct approach to any given problem. They can
draw on their broader set of tools and reserve the use of litigation
for when it makes strategic sense.
3. Paralegals are more capable than lawyers at straddling dualist legal
systems. This area is relatively unexplored amongst paralegal
efforts worldwide but our program in Sierra Leone engages both
formal and customary institutions in a way that formal legal aid
programs-which by their methodologies are focused on the
formal legal system-could not.
4. Paralegals need not limit themselves to an adversarial approach.
Voluntary mediation is one of paralegals' most powerful tools.
Paralegals' focus on harmonious reconciliation rather than
adversarialism resonates with some traditional approaches to
justice.
5. Paralegals are generally able to contribute to 'empowerment' more
than lawyers. This does not necessarily take place in every case,
but results from paralegals' proximity to the communities with
whom they work and paralegals' use of empowerment-oriented
tools like community organizing and community education.
D. Structural Issues in Paralegal Programming
If there is indeed a coherent approach that unifies the diversity of
paralegal efforts, it makes sense to consider in concert questions of how
paralegal programs should be structured. I would like to address three such
issues: training, remuneration, and relationship to the government.
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1. Training
In South Africa, paralegal training varies significantly, but some training
programs there reflect the push by some paralegals for professionalization. 
°°
Organizations like Lawyers for Human Rights and the Community Law and
Rural Development Center (CLRDC) provide formal courses; CLRDC's
twelve-month course takes place at the University of Natal and leads to a
diploma.101 The Legal Resources Foundation in Zimbabwe (LRF-Zimbabwe)
conducts a five-stage training program that takes place at intervals over the
course of three to four years. LRF-Zimbabwe also helped establish a paralegal
certification process, for which candidate paralegals must take five written
exams in required subjects and a practical exam. These exams are moderated
by the Judicial College and the certificates are approved by the Council for
Legal Education and the Law Society.'0 2 Despite opposition from Zimbabwe's
ruling party, then, Zimbabwean paralegals have some recognition from within
the legal system and the private bar.
All paralegal training need not be so formalized to be effective. Even
more important than courses at the outset, perhaps, is long-term supervision
from and interaction with social justice lawyers and other trainers. Golub finds
this to be one of the keys to the success of paralegals trained by alternative
law groups in the Philippines.
10 3
Not all of those claiming to do paralegal work are committed to this
longer-term approach. Many organizations in recent years have conducted
one-time trainings for community members with the intention that trainees
will serve as paralegals. In Sierra Leone, Global Rights recruited two
representatives from every chiefdom in Koinadugu and Kailahun districts, and
held a four-day "paralegal" training for the representatives in each district.
Trainees were provided a small allowance (10,000 Leones (U.S.D. $3.80) per
month) for transportation for the next six months, and were asked to write
reports of their paralegal activities. The trainees did not receive further
supervision after the initial training. In another version of one-off training,
organizations sometimes provide legal education sessions for existing NGO
workers and activists. Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid in Pakistan,
for example, conducts five-day "paralegal trainings" of this kind.' °4 Efforts
such as these by Global Rights in Sierra Leone and Lawyers for Human
Rights and Legal Aid in Pakistan may be useful ways of disseminating
information, but the trainees are perhaps not best thought of as paralegals. If
people who have received a few days' worth of training attempt to give advice
on justice issues under no supervision, there is the possibility of doing more
harm than good.
100. Interview with Martin Monyela, Director, National Community-Based Paralegals
Association, in Johannesburg, South Africa (Apr. 21, 2004).
101. David J. McQuoid-Mason, The Delivery of Civil Legal Aid Services in South Africa, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 111, 133-34 (2000).
102. See LEGAL RESOURCES FOUNDATION, supra note 85, at 7.
103. Golub, supra note 92, at 304.
104. Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid, Areas of Work: Paralegal Training,
http://www.lhrla.sdnpk.org/paralegal.html (last visited Mar. 07, 2006).
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To avoid this danger, it may be useful for paralegal programs or
paralegal associations in each country to develop standards for determining
who is qualified to work as a paralegal. Such standards could follow the
professionalist models in South Africa and Zimbabwe, which emphasize
courses, exams, and certification. There are other possibilities as well, such as
requiring a minimum number of hours spent under the supervision of lawyers
per month, or asking paralegal programs to go through a certification process
which evaluates whether each program as a whole is capable of ensuring the
competence of its paralegal staff.
2. Payment
Remuneration for paralegals varies considerably. Some receive (usually
relatively low) salaries like our paralegals in Sierra Leone. Others are
volunteers. Still others receive compensation for basic expenses, such as
transportation costs. In southern Africa, where paralegal movements are
pushing towards professionalization, most paralegals are paid, though the
salaries remain low. 105 I would venture that most paralegal programs which
are serious about providing a sophisticated service pay their staff. But
effective voluntary paralegal programs do exist.
Sentrong Alternatibong Lingap Panlegal (Saligan), a Filipino legal
services organization focused on agrarian land reform, trained a selected
group of members from a twelve hundred household-member farmers'
association. Of several dozen initial trainees, fifteen went on to carry out
robust paralegal work on a voluntary basis, assisting farmers to prepare and
file applications for land reform, representing farmers at agency hearings, and
assisting Saligan attorneys to defend against obstructionist lawsuits. Golub
identifies three key reasons for the success of the Saligan-trained paralegals:
first, their training was well-tailored to the specific tasks they were to engage
in; second, they received regular supervision and guidance from Saligan
lawyers; and third, perhaps most important for their efficacy in the absence of
remuneration, the paralegals belonged to a strong community organization. 10
6
3. Relationship to the Government
In most places, paralegals work without any form of recognition from
the state. In South Africa, whose paralegal movement has a particularly long
history, a proposed Legal Council Bill would recognize paralegals as
legitimate service providers. 107 South African paralegals are largely funded by
independent donors, but the national legal aid board has incorporated some
paralegals into its "justice centers." The justice centers primarily focus on
criminal legal defense (which is a mandatory constitutional obligation) but
105. McQuoid-Mason, supra note 101, at 133.
106. Golub, supra note 92, at 304.
107. One draft of the bill would also allow paralegals to collect fees and to represent clients in
low-level administrative courts. These two issues are among the controversies that have slowed the bill's
passage.
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provide some civil assistance as well. The legal aid board also sponsors some
partnership arrangements in which university law clinics provide litigation
support to clusters of paralegal offices working on a particular issue.' °s The
South African Legal Aid Board's support for not only lawyers but also
paralegals and university-based clinics is unusual.
As mentioned above, paralegals in Zimbabwe enjoy recognition from
the legal profession but at the same time face severe opposition from the
ruling party. Both Nigeria and Mongolia, in part as a result of advocacy by the
Justice Initiative, are close to granting statutory recognition of paralegals,
although neither country has a pre-existing vibrant paralegal movement within
its borders.
The Malawi Paralegal Advice Service (PAS) may be the strongest
example of paralegals working in cooperation with government. PAS
paralegals are authorized to work within the prisons, to fill out bail and
sentence appeal applications, and to meet with police prosecutors for the
purpose of negotiating cases. Although these paralegals are presently funded
by independent donors (among others, PAS is supported by the Department
for International Development (DFID) Security, Safety, and Access to Justice
fund in Malawi), the Malawi government might eventually fund PAS
paralegals because the paralegals make the government's own system work
more efficiently. At the same time that they improve Malawi's treatment of
human rights, PAS paralegals save the government money by eliminating the
cost of housing and feeding of wrongfully detained prisoners. The Malawi
program is an outstanding example worth promoting in other countries.
Indeed, PAS and Prison Reform International have facilitated the development
of similar pilot programs in Benin, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. 109
Something that both advances human rights and saves the government money
makes for a great sell.
But in exchange for greater recognition and sustainability, a close
integration with government like the kind undertaken in Malawi may cost in
independence. PAS paralegals cannot, for example, comment publicly about
the conditions in the prisons where they work; this is one of the conditions on
which they are granted access. The PAS cooperation agreements do not bar
paralegals from approaching prison authorities regarding prison conditions,
but the paralegals may tend to forego the opportunity. Two PAS paralegals I
met explained that, though they often witnessed terrible prison conditions,
they are reluctant to raise these issues because they need to maintain good
working relationships with the authorities in order to carry out their jobs
effectively."
0
Seeking governmental integration or government funding should not be
the goal, then, in every context. Paralegals in many places play a critical role
108. David McQuoid-Mason, South African Models of Legal Aid Delivery in Non-Criminal
Cases (Open Society Institute, 2nd European Forum on Access to Justice, Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.justiceinitiative.orgtdb/resource2?res jd=102841.
109. NEWSLEITER (Paralegal Advisory Service, Malawi), Sept. 2005, at 1, 6-9.
110. Interview with two PAS paralegals (who asked to remain unnamed), in Lilongwe, Malawi
(Nov. 23, 2005).
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in assisting ordinary people to challenge and contest repression and injustice
dealt out by the state. This was the situation when paralegals first gained
importance in South Africa, and this is the case in Zimbabwe today. The fact
that Mugabe's thugs are shutting down paralegal offices is all the more reason
that such work deserves independent funding.
Today's South Africa offers the beginnings of a middle ground between
integration and independence: the South African legal aid board is funded by
the government but structurally autonomous from it."' Paralegals receiving
funding from the legal aid board are not hampered from efforts that would
challenge the government. The same might be said of the United Kingdom,
where the legal services commission gives £24 million annually to citizens
advice bureaus. 112 As with South Africa, citizens advice bureaus which
receive monies from the U.K. legal services commission are not seen to suffer
any loss in independence.
But such middle ground might only be available in countries where
democracy is strong enough to welcome its critics, and where there is some
acceptance within government of the possibility of change from below.1 13 In
places where these conditions do not prevail, independent paralegal programs
can be a powerful force for democratization.
E. Paralegals and the International Human Rights and Development
Communities
Paralegal efforts need global support at two levels: at the level of
resources and at the level of ideas.
Donor support for paralegal programs is scattered. DFID has supported
some paralegal work through its Security, Safety, and Access to Justice
programming; the World Bank has supported paralegal work in certain
instances, including its "Justice for the Poor" program in Indonesia; and the
Ford Foundation has supported paralegal work in several places, including the
Philippines, Bangladesh, and India. Paralegal work does receive support from
other international donors, but for the most part on an ad hoc, country-specific
basis, often under "governance" or "social development" programs. No major
international institution that I am aware of has a policy or program dedicated
to supporting paralegal services.
111. See McQuoid-Mason, supra note 101, at 117.
112. CITizENs ADVICE, THE CHARITY FOR YOUR COMMUNITY: CITIZENS ADVICE ANNUAL
REPORT (2004).
113. The history of civil legal aid in the United States is a troubling case in point. Civil legal
services received strong support under Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty and grew steadily through the
1970s. These legal services programs succeeded in achieving myriad significant reforms of state policy.
Legal aid lawyers translated the experiences of their clients into reform efforts by bringing impact cases,
including class actions, and by lobbying legislatures. Ronald Reagan first attacked legal services as
governor of California and continued to do so as president. Republicans were aghast that federal money
was going toward changing government policies according to the interests of poor people. Legislation
passed in 1996, during Newt Gingrich's "Republican Revolution," gutted what was left of legal services
funding and placed crippling restrictions on legal aid lawyers: no class actions, no lobbying legislatures,
no representing prisoners or illegal aliens, etc. See William P. Quigley, The Demise oflaw Reform and
the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960's to the 1990's,
17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 241,260-61 (1998).
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Paralegal programs deserve to be promoted more systematically. When
there is genius in paralegal programs, however, it is almost always in the way
they adapt themselves to their unique contexts and work dialectically with
national and local social movements. If the World Bank chose to fly the flag
of paralegalism and began to undertake paralegal projects in many places, one
could imagine the possibilities for such genius being narrowed. Golub
suggests that international donors could expand support without crushing local
autonomy by operating like foundations rather than implementers, supporting
the paralegal work that emerges from the ground.114 Golub further suggests
that the exception to this rule might be situations in which civil society is so
damaged that sparks from outside are necessary. This was the rationale behind
the Justice Initiative's decision to initiate a paralegal effort in Sierra Leone.
Another useful role for international organizations would be to help
paralegal programs to learn from one another. For the most part, paralegal
efforts seem to have developed independently, like finch species in the
Galapagos. International donors could usefully facilitate exchanges and
experience sharing between analogous work in different contexts. 115 One issue
around which cross-country dialogue would be useful is the setting of
appropriate standards for how and whether one should qualify to work as a
paralegal. 116 Eventually one might envision the development of global
standards, though the challenge will be respecting the differences in socio-
legal context and in the nature of paralegal work across countries.
I see two primary needs at the level of ideas. First, there is a need to
better evaluate and more fully document the nature and impact of paralegal
work. Sound evidence and a richer literature will inform future efforts and
may inspire greater financial support. Relatedly, there is a need to make the
argument for the importance of paralegal activities regarding goals about
which we have global consensus: human rights and democracy. After decades
of World Bank-imposed user fees, the world now seems to agree, at least in
principle, that health care and education are fundamental obligations which
societies owe their citizens. Are services for people's justice-related problems
not also crucial to the health of a democratic society in something of the same
way? If so, then paralegal programs are one of the most powerful and
effective ways of providing such services. Repressive governments may not
accept these arguments, but donors and civil society organizations like
political parties, trade unions, and NGOs might, and if they did it would be
possible to generate more support for independent paralegal services,
especially in places where democracy and justice are weakest.
114. Telephone Interview with Stephen Golub, Lecturer, Boalt School of Law, in Berkeley,
Cal. (March 9, 2005).
115. One organization already dedicated to such experience-sharing is Citizens Advice
International. Launched in March 2004, it aims to connect "citizens advice" programs across countries
and to promote the citizens' advice model at the international level. It has seven members, all of which
are European countries except New Zealand.
116. See discussion supra Part I.D.l.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay has attempted to demonstrate the strength of the paralegal
approach both through a close examination of a young paralegal program in
Sierra Leone and through an assessment of the range and character of
paralegal programs existing in the world. Our paralegals in Sierra Leone have
worked with thousands of poor Sierra Leoneans to achieve concrete,
meaningful solutions to justice problems at low cost and under some of the
most severe structural circumstances in the world. Their successes echo those
of their counterparts in contexts as wide-ranging as urban England and rural
Bangladesh. The paralegal is a potent force for justice, yet the global human
rights and development communities have paid her relatively little attention.
At the first International Conference on Primary Health Care in what is
now Kazakhstan in 1978, some 134 countries committed to the Declaration of
Alma-Ata and the aim of providing primary health care to all people. The
vision of primary health care endorsed at Alma-Ata included an important role
for primary health workers, who would be connected to the formal health
system and who would use a diverse set of tools, including education,
immunizations, promotion of nutrition, and family planning, to deliver the
first line of health care. 117 The goals of Alma-Ata remain grossly unfulfilled,
but the spirit of Alma-Ata continues to animate the global public health
movement.
If the ideals of human rights are to be made real for all people, there is a
similar need for universal access to basic justice services. We have in the
institution of the paralegal a powerful method for providing such services, one
that combines knowledge of the law with the creative, flexible tools of social
movements. Paralegals relate to lawyers and the formal legal system not
unlike the way primary health workers relate to doctors and the formal
medical system: a dynamic force at the frontline, with a wider set of tools and
aims; a force which, when necessary, facilitates communication between the
people and the experts. If paralegal programs are well adapted to the contexts
in which they work, they have the potential to synthesize modem and
traditional approaches to justice and to bridge the often gaping chasm between
law and society. What we need now is a global movement to extend this
institution's reach, to provide primary justice services in every village and
every town.
117. See Declaration of Alma-Ata, Int'l Convention on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR,
art. 7 §§ 3, 7 (Sept. 6-12, 1978), available at http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declaration_
almaata.pdf.
